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ARTICLES
FACTUAL CAUSATION IN TOXIC TORT LITIGATION: A
PHILOSOPHICAL VIEW OF PROOF AND CERTAINTY
IN UNCERTAIN DISCIPLINES
Danielle Conway-Jones*
I. INTRODUCTION
The headline reads: "Town clenched in suffocating grip of as-
bestos: W.R. Grace & Co. closed its vermiculite mine in Libby,
Mont[ana], 10 years ago, but hazardous material was embedded
in the ore. Experts attribute many cases of lung disease to what
they call secondary exposure."' Lately, exposure to toxic sub-
stances and harm to human health and the environment have be-
come the norm, not the exception. Within the United States and
its territories alone, environmental groups, as well as individuals,
have documented the proliferation of harmful exposure to toxic
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Law. B.S., New York University Stem School of Business; J.D., Howard University School
of Law; LL.M., George Washington University Law School. The concept for this article was
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phis, Cecil C. Humphreys School of Law. Thank you to Dean Donald J. Polden and the Ce-
cil C. Humpbreys School of Law for funding the research of this article. Thank you to Mr.
Jay Atkins, Humphreys Fellow, for his enthusiastic and able research assistance. Thanks
also to Professors Janet Richards, Irma Russell, and Amanda Esquibel for their comments
and support during the early drafts and presentations of this article. Finally, many thanks
to Christopher Leon Jones, Jr., Esq. who once again made the trek to a new school and a
new town.
L John Ritter, Town Clenched in Suffocating Grip of Asbestos, USA ToDAY, Feb. 1,
2000, at 8A.
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substances from as far away as Kaho'olawe, Hawai'i,2 to as close
as Kelley Air Force Base in San Antonio, Texas.3
While exposure to toxic substances has become the norm, find-
ings of culpability against those responsible for creating the expo-
sure and any ensuing harm seem to be nonexistent. The reasons
for this lack of accountability rest in a judicial system that has
posed insurmountable standards for toxic exposure plaintiffs who
must hurdle myriad procedural and substantive obstacles just to
get through the courthouse doors. One of these hurdles is proof of
causation. In many instances, the judiciary represents a barrier
to the only relief that may be available to toxic exposure plain-
tiffs. While the judiciary does not seem uncaring, its gauntlet of
obstacles in the area of causation and proof renders justice for
toxic exposure plaintiffs scarce. The tests developing in the judi-
ciary for the causation factor in toxic tort litigation are unrealisti-
cally burdensome to plaintiffs and result in the dismissal of meri-
torious cases.
There is little doubt that the industrial revolution gave birth to
a technological era dependent on chemical and pharmaceutical
developments, laser advancements, and infrared products, all of
which are widely distributed to and consumed, either directly or
indirectly, by individuals.4 The byproducts of this consumption-
usually harmful environmental waste-have gone unnoticed or
ignored for decades, but consumers are becoming more informed
about the effects of technology and its byproducts on the envi-
ronment and on themselves. For example, in the 1970s, the
2. In 1920, the United States began bombarding the island. In 1939, the Army leased
the southern tip of the island to use as an artillery range. In 1941, the Navy gained exclu-
sive use of the island for gunnery and bombing training. In 1965, the Navy detonated one
of the most powerful non-nuclear bombs ever on the island. In 1976, the Protect
Kaho'olawe 'Ohana instituted legal action to restore Hawai'ian control of the island. In a
settlement agreement, the 'Ohana was able to negotiate for, among other things, the de-
tection and cleanup of unexploded ordnance and other alien debris. See generally Global
Town's Kaho'olawe, at http://www.global-town.com/abouthawaii/kahoolawe.htm (last
visited Nov. 16, 2001) (detailing the history of Kaho'olawe).
3. See Bill Day & Nicole Foy, Officials Claim Old Air Force Base Safe Despite Ex-
Workers' Diseases, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 10, 2000, at C10.
4. See Elam v. Alcolac, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 42, 175 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (recognizing de-
fendant's argument that modern life exposes everyone to countless chemicals and other
toxic residues from diverse sources); JULIE DAVIES ET AL., A TORTS ANTHOLOGY 423-35 (2d
ed. 1999) (discussing the beginning of products liability law and its attendant policies); see
also MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916) (recognizing that we live
in an organizational society in which traditional common law limitations on an actor's
duty must give way to the realities of society).
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American working class population became increasingly aware of
the dangers of friable asbestos used in all walks of industrial,
commercial, and even home life.5 Because of this awareness and
the foresight of scientific researchers, the asbestos industry was
required to account for its role in physically6 and efficiently7 caus-
ing so many to suffer merely because they handled a substandard
and ineffective insulation product.'
Today, consumers are plagued by more than just substandard
products. The byproduct of the use of biological, chemical, and
nuclear products is the threat of toxic exposure resulting from
substandard manufacturing processes, illegal and unregulated
dumping of chemicals and other waste or runoff material,9 inade-
5. Cf Ritter, supra note 1 (reporting on lung cancer clusters detected in Libby, Mon-
tana, where W.R. Grace operated a vermiculite mine that processed asbestos until 1990);
see generally Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973)
(discussing the dangers of asbestos within the context of a products liability suit).
6. See MARIO BUNGE, CAUSALITY: THE PLACE OF THE CAUSAL PRINCIPLE IN MODERN
SCIENCE 148 (1963). The physical cause represents linearity theory where one agent finds
itself in an active and productive state, while the effect produced by the active agent is a
passive consequence. An example of physical cause may be an actor's manufacture of an
agent. The active state and the passive consequence combine to represent a peripatetic
dichotomy of substances into agents and patients, without simultaneous account for the
concept of reactivity theory. As related to toxic causation, traditional legal theory requires
adherence to the former linearity theory, which requires proof of traceability. Modern legal
theory, however, would attach significance to concepts of reactivity or multi-factor theo-
ries, which requires expanded notions of proof to account for causal cycles or webs of cau-
sation. Id.
7. Id. at 5-7. The efficient cause is a clearly conceived concept of motion that can be
assigned an empirical correlate, namely an event, which produces another traceable event,
that can be deduced either by experience or by empirical testing. The efficient cause, in
short, is the actual agent, not the actor, producing some change. Id.
8. See Borel, 493 F.2d at 1082; see also Ritter, supra, note 1. Mr. Ritter reports that:
[more than 200,000 asbestos injury claims are pending in Federal and state
courts. Thousands of new cases are filed every year against companies in-
volved in mining and processing asbestos.... Grace officials now acknowl-
edge that asbestos from the mine caused lung disease in Libby, Montana, but
they deny that the company knew of the dangers but did not tell workers.
Mining vermiculite ore, breaking it and crushing it, separating it by size,
heating it to produce a type of commercial insulation, packing it for ship-
ping-all these processes created a staggering amount of very fine dust laced
with asbestos. Not only did the miners breathe the dust all day, they brought
it home on their clothes and in their vehicles. When the kids gave dad a hug,
they got a dose of asbestos. Wives did the laundry and shook out the clothes,
and the dust spread. One of the unfortunate ironies here is that the asbestos
was of no use at all to Grace, which spent a lot of money trying to figure out
how to market tremolite from the asbestos processing but found no commer-
cial use. In the end, it was just waste.
Id.
9. See Ayres v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287,292 (N.J. 1987).
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quate or absent warnings about product dangers," and flawed
product designs." Unlike asbestos exposure and the resulting in-
dustry accountability, current chemical, biological, nuclear, and
other product exposures, which are the subject of toxic tort litiga-
tion, are not readily or easily associated with their respective
sources. 2 These chemicals or products are not readily identifiable
as catalysts for various injuries that are alleged to be the result of
exposure. 1
3
Based upon these difficulties, the only clear observation in
toxic tort litigation is the unparalleled dilemma of establishing a
cause and effect relationship between a toxin and a plaintiffs in-
jury. This difficulty is magnified by the judiciary's preoccupation
with establishing direct traceability in toxic exposure cases to sat-
isfy the causation element. The emphasis on direct traceability, or
cause and effect, dominates the law of traditional torts, 14 but toxic
tort litigation cases prove that the causation element should not
be viewed as a fungible legal standard. Treating the causation
element the same in toxic tort cases as in traditional tort cases
will undermine society's attempts to achieve deterrence, compen-
sation, or corrective justice in meritorious cases of toxic expo-
sure.15
10. See Borel, 493 F.2d at 1093 (concluding that evidence at trial provided ample sup-
port that defendant operated its landfill in an unreasonable manner, and the chemical
contamination of plaintiffs' wells was caused by defendant's improper operation of its
landfill).
11. See Lee v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 721 F. Supp. 89, 95-96 (D. Md. 1989) (alleging
claim for strict liability in tort based upon design defect inherent in a breast prosthesis).
12. See Ora Fred Harris, Jr., Toxic Tort Litigation and the Causation Element: Is
There any Hope of Reconciliation, 40 Sw. L.J. 909, 912 (1986).
13. See id.
14. Id.
15. See GERALD W. BOSTON & M. STUART MADDEN, LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND
ToxIc TORTS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 4-20 (1994); see also Elam v. Alcolac,
Inc., 765 S.W.2d 42, 176 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (stating that the traditional and foremost pol-
icy of tort law is to deter harmful conduct and to ensure that innocent victims of that con-
duct will have redress).
Cognate principles of equity and economic efficiency also inform that policy:
that the cost of the pervasive injury which results from mass exposure to
toxic chemicals shall be borne by those who can control the danger and make
equitable distribution of the losses, rather than by those who are powerless to
protect themselves.
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Substantive concerns pervade the law of toxic torts, but none
are more troubling than the element of factual causation. 6 Prob-
lems with factual causation impact plaintiffs as well as defen-
dants involved in litigating toxic tort cases. Such problems are
encountered when dealing with long latency periods, traceability,
source or proper defendant identification, and specific toxin iden-
tification.
Long latency periods play a significant role in attempting to es-
tablish factual causation or to defend against its assertion. 7 Simi-
larly, long latency periods impede a plaintiffs ability to establish
a sufficient causal nexus between an actor's conduct and a plain-
tiffs injury." If a plaintiff can construct a causal nexus between
the agent and the host, however, she stands an improved chance
of reaching a jury. 9 Long latency periods adversely impact defen-
dants who may be required to respond to allegations of tortious
conduct many years after handling a toxin. Accordingly, defen-
16. Under traditional tort theory, factual causation, or causation-in-fact, is measured
by one of two tests. The first test is the "but for" test, and the second is the substantial fac-
tor test. The "but for" test is defined as an act or omission being the cause of a particular
event, if such an event would not have occurred absent the act. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 265-66 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter
PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS]. The substantial factor test is defined as two or more
causes joining together to bring about an event, and if any one of the causes, operating
alone, would be sufficient to bring about an event, then each cause must be responsible for
the event. In other words, an act or omission is the cause of an event, if it was a material
element in bringing about an event. Id. at 266-67. Factual causation under either test is
considered "peculiarly a question for the jury." Id. at 264-65.
17. See Johnston v. United States, 597 F. Supp. 374, 426 (D. Kan. 1984) (defining la-
tency as a period of seeming inactivity between time of exposure of tissue to an injurious
agent and response); Elam, 765 S.W.2d at 173-74; Ayres v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d
287, 299 (N.J. 1986).
18. See Bert Black & David E. Lilienfeld, Epidemiologic Proof in Toxic Tort Litigation,
52 FORDHAMi L. REv. 732, 738 (1984) (stating that since most toxic tort cases involve dis-
eases with long latency or incubation periods, and because many of these diseases may
occur in the absence of any identifiable exposure, causation very often becomes a central
and complex issue at trial).
19. The long latency question is a good example of the confluence between procedural
and substantive hurdles in toxic tort exposure cases. As a component of procedure, a long
latency period between exposure to an agent or toxin and the contracting of a disease pre-
sents statute of limitations dilemmas that may require procedural dismissal or summary
judgment. As a component of substance, the same long latency period impacts a plaintiffs
ability to present sufficient evidence to satisfy the burden of production of evidence on fac-
tual causation. These hurdles in toxic tort cases will remain virtually insurmountable in
the absence of normative judicial activism, which could level the playing field between
toxic exposure plaintiffs and those defendants likely responsible for the emission of toxic
products and byproducts.
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dants may have to institute burdensome record-keeping proce-
dures as well as costly toxin identification processes.
Additionally, toxic tort exposure cases present traceability is-
sues that are far more onerous than traceability issues presented
in the traditional tort paradigm. In traditional tort cases, plain-
tiffs rely on the epistemology2" of physical (an actor's conduct) and
efficient causes (the force set in motion), which result in testable
consequences, to establish factual causation.2' In most recent
toxic tort cases, victims of toxic exposure are estopped from rely-
ing on the epistemology of causes and consequences to satisfy the
crucial element of factual causation because courts and commen-
tators fear that toxic tort defendants will be overexposed to liabil-
ity for conduct that has yet to be completely explained or under-
stood by science.22 Accordingly, toxic tort plaintiffs are instead
required to merge epidemiology,23 toxicology,24 medical and clini-
cal sciences,25 quantitative and qualitative probabilities,26 physi-
cal causation,2" efficient causation,28 legal causation,29 and legal
20. See infra notes 47, 78.
21. The common law requires that the plaintiff establish causation with reasonable
certainty and specificity. See Harris, supra note 12, at 911 (stating that the plaintiff must
demonstrate cause-in-fact that comports with either the "but for" test or the "substantial
factor" test). Further, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
"but for" the defendant's conduct, the plaintiff would not have been injured. Id; see also
Elam, 765 S.W.2d at 174 (citing Allen v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 247, 416 (D. Utah
1984)) (stating that "[tihe substantial factor standard.., is particularly suited to injury
from chronic exposure to toxic chemicals where the sequent manifestation of biological
disease may be the result of a confluence of causes").
22. See Nancy Lee Firak, Alternative Forms of Liability: Developing Policy Aspects of
the Cause-in-Fact Requirement of Tort Law, 20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1041, 1049 (1988)
("[A]llowing recovery for increased risk overexposes defendants to liability, because not
every plaintiff who has an increased risk actually develops cancer.").
23. Epidemiology is the study of disease occurrence. It includes the study of associa-
tions, measured in terms of disease incidence, between disease and characteristics, i.e.,
age, habits, and the living conditions of individuals. The goal of epidemiology is to investi-
gate how toxic exposures influence the risk of developing a disease. The traditional com-
ponents of comparison in epidemiology are the disease occurrence among the exposed
population versus the disease occurrence among the unexposed population. See generally
THOMAS C. TIMMRECK, AN INTRODUCTION TO EPIDEMIOLOGY (2d ed. 1998).
24. Toxicology is the science of the effects, detection, and treatment of poisons. See
DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY (25th ed. 1965).
25. See infra notes 86-90; see also Elam, 765 S.W.2d at 185 (stating that the diagnosis
of disease in the plaintiff consistent with exposure is a subject of medicine).
26. See infra note 133.
27. See supra note 6.
28. See supra note 7. Although traditional tort actions expressly state the causation
requirement as factual causation measured by either the "but for" test or the "substantial
factor" test and legal causation, the element of causation is not an a priori primary as-
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persuasion"° into one neat package to meet the proof require-
ments for factual causation, the critical element in most common
law tort claims.3 '
Moreover, toxic exposure plaintiffs must also identify the
source of the toxin or the actor in control of the toxin prior to ex-
posure." In many cases, the requirement to identify the source of
the toxin or the proper defendant may be impossible. Many years
may pass from the time the defendant manufactured, processed,
or disposed of a toxic substance and the time that the plaintiffs
disease or injury surfaces. Thus, a plaintiff may not have access
to records or documents that would connect her exposure and in-
jury to a particular source or defendant.
Finally, toxic exposure plaintiffs must also identify the specific
sumption. Rather, it is an element that is subject to reductionism, particularly within the
legal discourse. The components of causation can be described as physical and efficient.
See supra notes 6-7.
29. See Ingram v. Acands, Inc., 977 F.2d 1332, 1340 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that cau-
sation in fact is unrelated to proximate or legal cause). Legal (proximate) cause is some-
times interpreted as the significance and importance of the relationship between the de-
fendant's conduct and the plaintiffs injuries, a lack of which may bar the plaintiffs claim.
While the defendant's conduct may be morally or otherwise reprehensible, legal policy
mandates that a lack of foreseeability or direct traceability to the plaintiffs injuries should
abrogate the defendant's responsibility. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note
16, § 42, at 272-73.
30. See infra note 226.
31. Every potentially viable tort claim upon which recovery for toxic exposure is based
requires some range of proof on the element of factual causation. The range of available
common law tort theories for recovery include, but may not be limited to, the following:
trespass, nuisance, strict liability for abnormally dangerous activity, negligence, products
liability, and strict products liability. See Roger S. Stark, Common Law Theories of Liabil-
ity in Toxic Torts, T.M. COOLEY ENVTL. J., Winter 1999, at 10, 10-15, available at
http://www.cooleylaw.edutpublications/greenpagesenlwinter99.pdf. More recently, cases
illustrate emerging claims like medical monitoring, fear of cancer or fear of enhanced risk
of disease, and enhanced risk of disease. See James M. Garner et al., Medical Monitoring:
The Evolution of a Cause of Action, 30 ENVTL. L. REp. 10024 (2000); see also Thomas
Parker Redick et al., Fear of Cancer Claims After Potter v. Firestone, A.B.A. SEC. Toxic
TORTS & ENvTL. LITIG. CoMm. NEWSL. 1 (2000). In other cases, litigants rely on inten-
tional tort theories, like toxic assault and battery, conspiracy, and fraud, to recover for
toxic exposure and injuries. See, e.g., Koehn v. Ayers, 26 F. Supp. 2d 953, 955 (S.D. Tex.
1998).
32. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924, 927 (Cal. 1980). The indetermi-
nate defendant is a causation problem because the plaintiff usually has little or no proof
establishing the source, producer, or manufacturer of the toxic substance that is the plau-
sible culprit in bringing about the plaintiffs disease or injury. Id. at 929. Cf In re "Agent
Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 819 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (establishing as a legal
hurdle the inability to identify the manufacturer of the herbicides sprayed in Vietnam,
because the United States Government mixed the substances from several manufacturers
before spraying).
20021
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toxin that produces the type of injury from which they suffer.33
Toxin identification creates a factual causation problem for plain-
tiffs if categories of injuries cannot be attributed to the toxin or if
categories of injuries can be attributed to other causes as well as
the toxin. Because a toxic exposure plaintiff may have encoun-
tered various background risks, proving that the specific toxin
caused her injury strongly militates against a finding of factual
causation in today's legal climate.
In addition to substantive concerns related to factual causa-
tion, procedural concerns also exist in establishing proof of fac-
tual causation.34 One concern is the statute of limitations argu-
ment raised by a defendant as an affirmative defense to a
plaintiffs claims of tortious toxic exposure. Plaintiffs respond
that the statute of limitations has not run, because the statute
was tolled by the application of the discovery rule.35 The statute
of limitations analysis is far from uncontroversial.
33. The plaintiff must address that a component of background risk is exposure to tox-
ins, which are a fungible byproduct created from the natural environmental decomposition
of the toxin. Some courts do not require the identification of the specific toxin because the
burden of proof on the plaintiffwould be too great. See Earl v. Cryovac, 772 P.2d 725, 732-
33 (Idaho Ct. App. 1989); see also Elam v. Alcolac, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 42, 179 (Mo. Ct. App.
1988) (holding that the identity of the toxic substances to which the harm is attributed
may be shown by circumstantial evidence). But see Cottle v. Superior Court of Ventura, 5
Cal. Rptr. 2d 882, 884 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (requiring plaintiff to state the chemical or
toxic substance to which the plaintiff was exposed); Herrington v. Leaf River Forest Prod-
ucts, Inc., 733 So. 2d 774, 777 (Miss. 1999).
Where a party, who has the burden of proof, has the power to produce evi-
dence of a more explicit, direct, and satisfactory character than that which he
does introduce and relies on, he must introduce that... proof, or else suffer
the presumption that, if the more satisfactory evidence had been given, it
would have been detrimental to him and would have laid open deficiencies in,
and objections to, his case, which the more obscure and uncertain evidence
did not disclose.
Id. (quoting Masonite Corp. v. Hill, 154 So. 2d 295, 298 (Miss. 1934)).
34. See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-26 (1986) (examining the use
of summary judgment to pass on the admissibility of an expert's testimony); United States
v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3d Cir. 1985) (using motions in limine to exclude expert
testimony); "Agent Orange", 597 F. Supp. at 800 (discussing the statute of limitations and
discovery rules when used to time bar claims); Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863
P.2d 795, 820 (Cal. 1993) (examining failure to state a claim when dealing with emotional
harm after exposure that is not accompanied by physical injury); Elam, 765 S.W.2d at 188
(directing and overturning jury verdicts).
35. The discovery rule requires that the statute of limitations begins to accrue on the
date that the plaintiff knew or should have known of the cause of action. In addition, some
jurisdictions also require that the plaintiff have constructive knowledge of the causal link
to the defendant before the statute of limitations will accrue. See Raymond v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 371 A.2d 170, 174 (N.H. 1977).
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The controversy is magnified by the ideological clash between
negative paternalism and populace utilitarianism.36 For example,
a defendant may present the argument that a plaintiff need not
see a physician and receive a diagnosis before the statute of limi-
tations begins to run. The defendant will state that this over pro-
tection results in negative paternalism because it undercuts an
individual's control and knowledge over his person and his bodily
functions. Thus, a defendant will urge that the discovery rule
should not be interpreted according to a litmus test rule that
knowledge exists only after medical confirmation of an injury. On
the other hand, populace utilitarianism suggests that the good of
the many is achieved by not requiring a race to litigation with
less than sufficient proof of the existence of a disease or injury.
Thus, the statute of limitations should not begin to run until the
lay person receives credible information from a medical profes-
sional that a disease or injury is present. The tension between the
statute of limitations and the discovery rule is obvious. Defen-
dants are aided by the application of the statute of limitations,
One might read several discovery rule cases and conclude that the courts
are applying two substantively distinct rules. In most cases the courts frame
the rule in terms of the plaintiffs discovery of the causal relationship be-
tween his injury and the defendant's conduct. In some cases ... a court will
state simply that, under the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues when
the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered his injury. Still other courts
use both statements of the rule within the same case. The reason for these
apparent differences is that in most cases in which the court states the rule
in terms of the discovery of the injury, the injury is the kind that puts the
plaintiff on notice that his rights have been violated.... In a case... in
which the injury and the discovery of the causal relationship do not occur si-
multaneously, it is important to articulate exactly what the discovery rule
means.... [Tihe proper formulation of the rule and the one that will cause
the least confusion is the one adopted by the majority of the courts: A cause of
action will not accrue under the discovery rule until the plaintiff discovers or
in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered not only that
he has been injured but also that his injury may have been caused by the de-
fendant's conduct.
Id.
36. The phrase "negative paternalism" refers to the concept that a class of individuals
can receive rights protection in spite of any ambivalence to take affirmative steps to pro-
tect their rights, while another opposing class of individuals must defend against the law's
proxy protection of such rights. See JOHN KLEINIG, PATERNALISM 13 (1984). The phrase
"populace utilitarianism" refers to the concept that a community advancing a democrati-
cally conceived social contract will benefit on the whole by adherence to rules designed to
protect the entire community. See Liam Murphy, Beneficence, Law, and Liberty: The Case
of Required Rescue, 89 GEO. L.J. 605 (2001) (defining utilitarianism as "a normative the-
ory that explains all of morality and political justice in terms of positive obligation-the
single positive obligation to benefit people as much as possible"). See generally JOHN
STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM (George Sher ed., Hackett Pub. Co. 1979) (1861).
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while plaintiffs are aided by the application of the discovery rule.
This tension defines an important procedural concern in proving
factual causation.
In addition to substantive and procedural issues, there exists
external concerns that impact a plaintiffs ability to prove factual
causation in toxic tort litigation. One external problem is the ex-
istence of background risks that may cause a harm similar to the
type of harm that could also be caused by exposure to a toxic sub-
stance. Scientific proof must isolate, or at the very least, account
for background risks before plaintiffs can affirmatively state, with
sufficient mathematical probability, that a toxic exposure is caus-
ally related to or associated with a disease or injury. The persis-
tent reality is that populations in industrialized communities are
exposed to multiple natural, as well as artificial, byproducts that
may affect individuals as readily as any exposure to a toxic sub-
stance. To account for this reality, the law of toxic torts invariably
must consider the impact of background risks of exposure that
will result from mere existence in such a community.37 In addi-
37. Epidemiologists refer to background risks as confounding variables or confound-
ers.
[Variables... known to be related to, associated with, or that can influence
the state of the subjects being studied are confounding variables. Confound-
ing variables can affect controls and may lead to biased or misguided associa-
tion between disease and cause, the agent or risk factors. Any characteristic,
trait, or other factor that can distort or slant the results of a study can be a
confounding variable if not taken into account or considered. Some of the
more important variables that can be confounding to cases or controls are
age, sex, race, occupation, education, [and] socioeconomic status. Any factor
that distorts the outcome or effect of a study confounds the facts and objectiv-
ity of the results. Any factor that causes unequal distribution among the ex-
posed and unexposed (cases and controls) can also distort or confound the
outcome of the study.
TIMMERECK, supra note 23, at 240. For example, cigarette smoking is a common con-
founder or background risk.
[Clonsider a study to determine whether alcohol drinkers experience a
greater incidence of oral cancer than teetotalers. Smoking is an extraneous
factor that is related to the disease (smoking has an effect on oral cancer in-
cidence); it is also associated with alcohol drinking, since there are many
people who are general 'abstainers,' refraining from alcohol consumption,
smoking, and perhaps other habits. Consequently, alcohol drinkers include
among them a greater proportion of smokers than would be found among
nondrinkers. Since smoking increases the incidence of oral cancer, alcohol
drinkers will have a greater incidence than nondrinkers quite apart from any
influence of alcohol drinking itself but simply as a consequence of the greater
amount of smoking among alcohol drinkers. Thus, the apparent effect of al-
cohol drinking is distorted by the effect of smoking; the two effects are inter-
mixed in the single comparison of alcohol drinkers with nondrinkers. The de-
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tion, the nature of the injury itself must be studied, isolated, and
then categorized as the type of injury that can result from expo-
sure to a particular toxic substance. Because of myriad substan-
tive, procedural, and external concerns, factual causation remains
a moving target for toxic exposure plaintiffs.
The purpose of this article is to expose the ontologically proof-
based requirements for factual causation created by the judiciary
and imposed against toxic exposure plaintiffs. Part II first ex-
plains the differences between factual causation in traditional
tort cases and factual causation in toxic tort cases, then deter-
mines that the "but for" paradigm of traditional tort cases is an
unrealistic burden to toxic exposure plaintiffs resulting in the dis-
missal of meritorious toxic tort claims. Part II also will analyze
the various threshold requirements for establishing factual cau-
sation and compares these requirements to determine the test
that best balances the interests between toxic exposure plaintiffs
and defendants. Part III discusses the burdens of proof for factual
causation and illustrates the tension between legal standards of
admissibility and sufficiency and scientific standards of reliability
and certainty. Part III also argues that the tension between law
and science and the dangers of summarily dismissing meritorious
toxic tort claims requires courts to consider that: (1) toxic tort de-
fendants receive unfair advantages over toxic exposure plaintiffs
in the current legal climate; (2) the judiciary has a responsibility
to level the playing field between parties by establishing clear,
defined, and fair procedural and substantive standards for admit-
ting and weighing scientific evidence of factual causation; and (3)
the judiciary must remain vigilant in propounding the corrective,
distributive, compensatory, and deterrent purposes of the tort
system. Finally, Part IV concludes that beyond scientific and
medical certainties of proof of factual causation, philosophical and
moral arguments exist which require the judiciary to recognize
that toxic tort defendants should not be permitted to seek cover
under varying yet stringent standards of proof for factual causa-
gree of bias or distortion depends on the magnitude of the smoking effect as
well as on the strength of association between alcohol and smoking. Either
absence of a smoking effect on oral cancer incidence or absence of an associa-
tion between smoking and alcohol would lead to no confounding. Smoking
must be associated with both oral cancer and alcohol drinking for it to be a
confounding factor.
KENNETH J. ROTHIAN, MODERN EPIDEMIOLOGY 90 (1986).
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tion. As in any causal relationship, what is projected as a conse-
quence is tested through experience.
The experience in an industrialized community is that toxic
tort defendants profit from the use of toxins, and that such use,
whether proved today or in years to come, will adversely impact
the health of individuals. Social justice is a legitimate goal that
can be achieved by fairly solving the controversies between toxic
exposure plaintiffs and toxic tort defendants confronted with the
issue of factual causation. Like traditional tort plaintiffs, toxic
exposure plaintiffs should have an equal right to pursue social
justice through litigation, and their efforts should not be
thwarted by unrealistic standards of proof and admissibility.
Courts may be informed by science and ontological ideology, but
these same courts should not ignore epistemological ideology-
that various consequences, including toxic harm, are experienced
from exposure to toxins, and that those who profit from the use of
the toxins shoulder a responsibility both philosophically and mor-
ally to those who are harmed.
II. THE CAUSATION ELEMENT IN Toxic TORT LITIGATION
No issue is more difficult in environmental tort litigation than
resolving the question of "whether the exposure to a toxic sub-
stance is the cause in fact of a plaintiffs harm." 8 Generally, cau-
sation has been explained and satisfied by demonstrating a
nexus, a link, or some form of traceability between wrongful con-
duct and an injury. 9 The traditional common law "but for" test
defines causation and, as applied, illustrates the "cause and ef-
fect" relationship between an event and a consequence." The "but
for" test assumes a linear and deductive connection between one
event and the happening of another expected event.4' Realizing
that most events cannot be isolated to support the linear and de-
38. BOSTON & MADDEN, supra note 15, at 339.
39. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 16, § 41, at 266. Taking a person
out to sea is a cause of death of the person when he sinks without a trace immediately
upon falling into the ocean, but failure to have a lifeboat ready is not a cause of the death.
Id. at 265.
40. See id. at 266.
41. See D.S. Shwayder, Causation and Causal Theories, Hume Was Right, Almost;
and Where He Wasn't, Kant Was, in 9 MIDWEST STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY 141 (Peter A.
French et al. eds., 1984) [hereinafter MIDWEST STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY].
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ductive connections between them, jurisprudence accounts for
multiple catalytic events by measuring causation according to a
"substantial factor" test. 2 The "substantial factor" test assumes
that events may occur practically simultaneously to set in motion
the happening of other resultant events.43 Both of these tests are
predicated on the assumption that events can be isolated, identi-
fied, and unquestionably associated with an expected event.
The fundamental underlying assumptions about causation
were rarely questioned in traditional tort jurisprudence, and
thus, resultant consequences or injuries that could not be ex-
plained within the context of either the "but for" or "substantial
factor" tests would not be attributed to one or more actors respon-
sible for the preceding events. The unexplained results or the un-
foreseeable consequences were handled under the judicially cre-
ated rule of proximate or legal cause.' Proximate cause allowed
judges to contract or extend the liability of an actor based upon
an attempt to infuse public policy to achieve the tort goals of cor-
rective justice, deterrence, or compensation.45 This judicial
method of ultimately determining liability is responsible for the
many successes in the current tort system with respect to the pro-
tection of an individual's right to be free from mental or bodily
harm resulting from the wrongful conduct of another.
Unquestionably, early toxic tort decisions, like Borel v. Fibre-
board Paper Products Corp.,46 recognized the importance of
proximate cause principles and fair and balanced conclusions on
liability in toxic tort cases. But the present trend in toxic tort liti-
gation is to reduce the significance of the proximate cause princi-
ple and place more weight on stringent standards for factual cau-
42. Unlike the "but for" test, which accounts for only one cause and thus is regarded
as a rule of exclusion, the "substantial factor" test accounts for the happening of multiple
causes to bring about a consequence. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 16, §
41, at 266. According to the 'substantial factor" test, any one of the causes, operating
alone, would be sufficient to cause the exact consequence. Id. at 267.
43. Id. at 468.
44. Proximate cause is far removed from factual causation in that its purpose is to
measure the extent to which an actor should be legally responsible for the consequences of
his act. At times, proximate cause may depend upon the significance or importance that
an actor's conducts plays in bringing about a consequence. The test for proximate cause
depends on the policy of the law and if that policy will extend the responsibility for the
conduct to the consequences that result. See id. at 273.
45. See id. at 273-74.
46. 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973).
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sation. The factual causation element in toxic tort litigation has
eclipsed the public policy and social justice principles embedded
in proximate causation. Abandoning proximate cause is tanta-
mount to expressing that an ontological approach to finding fac-
tual causation is the only philosophical means to substantiate a
"cause and effect" relationship in toxic tort cases.47 Thus, com
mentators are correct that "no issue is more difficult in environ-
mental tort litigation than resolving the question of whether the
exposure to the toxic substance was the cause in fact of plaintiffs
harm."4
8
A. Proof of Factual Causation in Toxic Tort Litigation
"The threshold requirement for establishing causation varies
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction."49 For example, in many jurisdic-
tions the prevailing test for factual causation in traditional tort
cases is the "but for" test. The "but for" test recognizes that a de-
fendant's act is the cause in fact of the plaintiffs injuries if harm
to the plaintiff would not have occurred in the absence of the de-
fendant's conduct.5" The "but for" test requires the plaintiff to
show that non-negligent conduct by the defendant would have
avoided harm to the plaintiff.5 For example, if defendant negli-
gently drives his car and rear ends plaintiffs car, plaintiff is
jarred and hits her head on the steering wheel and is cut, defen-
dant driver's conduct is considered a "but for" cause of the harm
done to the plaintiff. The "but for" test has been used successfully
in many tort cases, but the test accounts for the existence of only
one cause. A negligent defendant can effectively argue that negli-
gent conduct or non-negligent conduct from another source con-
47. See Descriptive and Formal Ontology, available at http:/ /www.formalontology.itl
section_4.htm (last modified Nov. 1, 2001). Ontology is the study of being. It is not reduci-
ble to pure cognitive analysis. In philosophical terms, it is not an epistemology or a theory
of knowledge. Ontology represents the purely objective, while epistemology represents the
theory of knowledge of the subjective side of reality. The two sides are obviously interde-
pendent, but this is not to imply that they are the same, i.e., exactly like the head and tail
of a coin. See infra note 78.
48. BOSTON & MADDEN, supra note 15, at 339.
49. L. Grant Foster, A Case Study in Toxic Tort Causation: Scientific and Legal Stan-
dards Work Against Recovery for Victims, 19 ENvTL. L. 141, 147 (1988).
50. See Christopher L. Callahan, Establishment of Causation in Toxic Tort Litigation,
23 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 605, 606 (1991).
51. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 168, at 409 (2000).
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tributed to plaintiffs harm and, therefore, liability cannot attach
pursuant to the "but for" test. Thus, the "but for" test is viewed as
unfair and unworkable in multiple cause tort scenarios, not just
toxic tort litigation.
In order to remedy the inequity of a negligent defendant escap-
ing liability because she is able to point to another cause for
plaintiffs harm in addition to her own, tort law modified the "but
for" test in multiple cause scenarios to the "substantial factor"
test.5 2 Under the "substantial factor" test, courts tend to take an
epistemological approach to causation, which comports with legal
policy that balances the equities between the multiple actors or
causes and the injured plaintiff.53 The "substantial factor" test al-
lows a plaintiff to recover for her harm when two or more defen-
dants engage in tortious conduct that injures her, when the con-
duct of either defendant standing alone could have caused the
same harm.54 The "substantial factor" test requires no reasoning
beyond identifying preemptive causation;55 instead, it invites the
jury to exercise intuitive and experiential knowledge as opposed
to reaching a conclusion based only upon legal certainty. The
"substantial factor" test implicitly recognizes that fairness and
justice cannot always be resolved with surgical precision. Because
courts have taken an epistemological approach to traditional tort
cases by recognizing the equity achieved by the "substantial fac-
tor" test, it would seem consistent to apply this same policy ap-
proach to resolve problems of multiple defendants or causes in
toxic tort litigation.
Courts presiding over early toxic tort cases applied the episte-
mological approach to these complex controversies. Courts pri-
marily relied on a mixture of epistemology and ontology when
52. Id. § 171, at 415.
53. See Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 136, 156 (1992) ("[11n the
past fifteen years, a few courts have permitted recovery for the increased risk of disease
from exposure to toxic substances.") This was the case in Petriello v. Kalman, 576 A.2d
474, 484 (Conn. 1990) where the court allowed plaintiff to recover on a claim of increased
risk of future harm only after plaintiff satisfied the substantial factor test for causation.
54. DOBBS, supra note 51, § 171, at 416.
55. Preemptive cause depicts a temporal disassociation between events, which pro-
tects a defendant from unlimited liability under the substantial factor test. For example, if
defendanfs conduct causes plaintiffs harm before the happening of another's negligent
conduct that would characteristically bring about the same harm already suffered by
plaintiff, the second actor's conduct is preempted because of the first defendanfs conduct.
Id.
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presented with information in the form of scientific and medical
evidence of factual causation. Courts were less likely to make
conclusive determinations on the issue of factual causation and
its establishment by probabilistic evidence. Conversely, courts
were prone to view both probabilistic evidence and legal policy or
intuition together to arrive at an equitable decision about the
submission of the case to the trier of fact.56 This observation does
not mean that courts ignored scientific evidence based upon sta-
tistics; rather, it means that courts were unwilling to abandon
epistemology altogether as a component of a fair and just result
on the issue of factual causation. This hybrid philosophical (mix-
ture of epistemology and ontology) approach to factual causation
and scientific and medical expert testimony yielded a suitable
foundation for fair treatment of litigants in early toxic tort cases.
The hybrid philosophical approach to factual causation in
United States common law is best illustrated by Borel, one of the
most notable toxic tort cases of the Twentieth Century. Mr. Borel
was an industrial insulation worker from 1936 until 1969, the
year he was diagnosed with the disabling disease called asbesto-
sis." His primary task was to install the insulation product, as-
bestos.5" He performed this task without knowing the dangerous
effects of asbestos on the human body.5 9 Neither his employer nor
the asbestos manufacturers told Mr. Borel or other asbestos in-
stallation workers about the adverse health effects of asbestos, °
even though independent medical literature from private as well
as government sources confirming these adverse effects was pub-
lished and accepted in the medical and scientific communities.6'
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed
the lower court's decision that asbestos manufacturers were re-
sponsible for Mr. Borel's injuries on the theory of product liability
negligence," more specifically, for failing to warn of the dangers
involved with handling asbestos.6 The Fifth Circuit reasoned
that the asbestos manufacturers failed to provide Mr. Borel and
56. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1081 (5th Cir. 1973).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1082.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1083.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1081.
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other insulation workers with adequate warnings about the dan-
gers of inhaling friable asbestos particles and the need to take
precautions by wearing respirators while working with the insu-
lation material.'
The Fifth Circuit and the trial court both examined factual
causation using a hybrid philosophical approach. Specifically, the
Borel court viewed medical literature from the 1950s and 1960s
as well as government studies on the issue of factual causation.65
The court looked to plaintiffs expert, Dr. Hans Weill,66 who testi-
fied "that prior to 1935 there were literally 'dozens and dozens' of
articles on asbestos and its effect on man."6" The trial court was
convinced that the test for factual causation was met in this case
even after reviewing the testimony of an expert presented by the
asbestos manufacturers.6" Defendants' expert witness, Dr. Clark
Cooper, stated, "it was known in the 1930s that inhaling asbestos
dust caused asbestosis and that the danger could be controlled by
maintaining a modest level of exposure." 9 Based on the testi-
mony and the medical literature compiled by both plaintiff and
defendants, ° the Fifth Circuit agreed with the trial court that a
question of fact on the issue of factual causation was ripe for the
jury.' According to the context of the case, Doctors Weill and
Cooper were not required to tailor their testimony to the duality
test of factual causation or to standards of admissibility. 2 Rather,
these experts gave their opinions about the causal link between
exposure to asbestos, the levels of exposure, and plaintiffs in-
jury. 3 Thus, relying on the hybrid philosophical approach, the
trial court accepted the testimony of the experts presented by
64 Id. at 1098-99.
65. Id. at 1084-85.
66. The case does not expressly state that Dr. Weill is an expert for the plaintiff, but
the statement that he was an expert can be inferred from the context of the discussion
about expert witnesses. See id. at 1092.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1093.
69. Id.
70. For a lst of studies that were presented by both parties in support of or in opposi-
tion to the adverse effect of asbestos on the human body, see Borel, 493 F.2d at 1083 n.1,
1084 nn.3-11, 13.
71. See Borel, 493 F.2d at 1094.
72. See infra notes 292-316 and accompanying text.
73. See Borel, 493 F.2d at 1094.
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both parties, but left the weighing of this testimony and the
credibility of it to the trier of fact.74
The trial court's treatment of these experts as competent to ex-
press an opinion provides insight into the role of scientific and
medical testimony in litigation. Furthermore, the trial court real-
ized that the role of such expert testimony should not be curtailed
by evidentiary mechanisms, which fail to account for the differ-
ences between scientific or medical expert opinions and the legal
conclusions regarding the correctness of those opinions.
In addition to including the testimony of the experts based
upon a hybrid philosophical approach to establishing factual cau-
sation, the Borel court applied this same approach to the substan-
tive factual causation dilemma presented by the various defen-
dants joined in the action.75 Thus, it can be inferred that a
problem with indeterminacy existed with regard to both the
sources of the plaintiffs injury and the wrongful actor. The
source, i.e., the exact asbestos particle inhaled by plaintiff, can be
considered the physical cause76 of plaintiffs injury, and the
wrongful actor, i.e., the asbestos manufacturers who failed to
provide adequate warnings, can be considered the efficient
cause77 of the plaintiffs injury. The Fifth Circuit realized that the
plaintiffs injury could not have occurred without the combination
of these two causes. Therefore, the court did not ponder the
traceability formula that works well with simplistic factual cause
and effect situations found in many traditional tort cases because
that theory would work a serious injustice against Mr. Borel,
whose case involved multiple tortfeasors. To affirm justice in this
case, the Fifth Circuit applied the hybrid philosophical approach78
74. See id.
75. The plaintiffs original complaint named the following manufacturers as defen-
dants: Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp.; Standard Asbestos Manufacturing and Insulating
Co.; Unarco Industries, Inc.; Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc.; Combustion Engineering, Inc.;
Fibreboard Paper Products Corp.; Johns-Manville Products Corp.; Pittsburgh Corning
Corp.; Phillip Carey Corp.; Armstrong Cork Corp.; and Ruberoid Corp. See id. at 1086,
n.17.
76. The physical cause may be described as the necessary cause or the sine qua non,
without which the injury cannot occur.
77. The efficient cause represents the external force acting on the physical cause to
produce change.
78. See MIDWEST STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, supra note 41, at 135. According to modern
empiricism, the status of the causation category concerns solely our experience and knowl-
edge of things, without being a trait of the things themselves. Thus, the epistemological
view of causation refers to conceptual events regardless of the relationship of these events
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to support its conclusion that the trial court and the sitting jury
could reasonably have concluded that Mr. Borel proved the fac-
tual causation element.7 ' Based upon experience and perception,
these judges agreed that:
Borel contracted asbestosis from inhaling asbestos dust.... [Ile was
exposed to the products of all the defendants on many occasions....
[The effect of exposure to asbestos dust is cumulative, that is, each
exposure may result in an additional and separate injury. [Thus,] on
the basis of strong circumstantial evidence the jury could find that
each defendant was the cause in fact of some injury to Borel.8
0
This unencumbered epistemological approach to finding that a
genuine issue of material fact existed, for which the jury is the
decision-maker, is on an unfortunate decline in toxic tort juris-
prudence. Generally, in current toxic tort litigation, many courts
require scientific and medical experts to prove factual causation
in accordance with a purely ontological approach, which, in effect,
leaves no room for the trier of fact to apply experiential knowl-
edge to the calculus to find factual causation.
Unlike today's cases, the Borel court treated the experts' opin-
ions as a matter of credibility and, thus, the court did not seek to
exclude scientific and medical testimony as inadmissible.
Through its opinion, the court expressed that the jury was capa-
ble of weighing both scientific and medical testimony to arrive at
a fair and just verdict."' In addition, the court relied on the tradi-
tional principle of proximate cause to set the extent to which the
to reality. In this context, causation is determined by the relationship between an event
and its related, perceived, or previously experienced outcome. The recognized combination
of the epistemological and ontological views of factual causation in traditional tort cases is
an accepted philosophy because courts dealing with traditional tort cases retain a sense of
certainty about potential outcomes in these cases. Alternatively, this very same view
seems absent or eroded in the analysis of toxic tort cases and issues of factual causation.
In toxic tort cases, courts are attempting to apply a purely ontological view to factual
causal determinations, where factual causation issues are inherently uncertain. The
courts apply this view to erect the same degrees of certainty to which they are accustomed
to seeing in traditional tort cases. The application of pure ontological theory fails because
it does not account for the natural undercurrent of related experience that is a necessary
component to evaluate real or fact-based events. See generally BUNGE, supra note 6.
79. See Borel, 493 F.2d at 1094.
80. See id.
81. See id. at 1092-94; cf. Aguilar v. Citgo Ref. & Chem. Co., [Nov. 25, 1998] 13 Toxic
L. Rep. (BNA) 809 (S.D. Tex- Nov. 3, 1998) (deciding that plaintiffs presented sufficient
evidence to send the case to the jury, even without expert testimony. The judge placed the
responsibility of weighing the evidence squarely on the jury. The jury then returned a ver-
dict for defendant.).
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defendants would be liable for the injuries caused by their con-
duct. 2 On the issue of proximate causation, the Fifth Circuit re-
lied on the foreseeability test to analyze what the defendants
knew or should have known about the dangers that exposure to
asbestos posed.83 Based on the existing medical literature and the
defendants' status as an expert,8' the Fifth Circuit agreed with
the district court that the dangers of inhaling asbestos were fore-
seeable because the accepted medical literature documented that
each exposure to asbestos could result in cumulative injury to the
inhaler." The court's focus was on properly limiting defendants'
liability to ensure a fair resolution between the wrongdoer and
the injured party. The court did not seek to insulate defendants
from responsibility by placing additional obstacles in front of the
plaintiff on the issue of factual causation.86 Instead, the court
used the tried and tested legal doctrines of proximate cause and
foreseeability to balance the equities between the asbestos manu-
facturers and Mr. Borel" The current trend in toxic tort cases,
however, is to erect substantive and procedural obstacles, for ex-
ample, a dual factual causation test and stringent admissibility
standards. Courts are erecting these obstacles without regard to
the inherent differences between scientists and treating physi-
cians and disregarding the need for balancing the equities that
the Fifth Circuit achieved in Borel.88
Unlike Mr. Borel and other plaintiffs in traditional tort cases,
many toxic exposure plaintiffs must now meet an additional sub-
stantive requirement for establishing factual causation. This new
82. See Borel, 493 F.2d at 1093.
83. Id.
84. The Fifth Circuit concluded that defendants were experts because they were in the
business of researching, testing, manufacturing, and marketing asbestos. See id. at 1089-
90.
85. Id. at 1092.
86. For example, the court did require that factual causation could only be established
by expert testimony.
87. See Borel, 493 F.2d at 1093.
88. See generally Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Causation: Notes Toward
a New Theory of Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2117 (1997) (espousing the
principles of achieving greater justice and combining theory with pragmatism require the
substantive law governing toxic torts to be recast by abolishing proof of the general causa-
tion prong of factual causation as the crucial factor that controls liability). Professor Ber-
ger states that the current "causation model is blind to the realities of scientific uncer-
tainty and corporate behavior, and is inconsistent with notions of moral responsibility
underlying tort law." Id. at 2117.
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requirement is scientific and medical expert testimony. 9 But
proffering expert testimony is not a guarantee of winning a toxic
tort case, nor is it even a guarantee for surviving a motion for
summary judgment requested by a defendant who is armed with
an equal number of experts.9 ° This new substantive requirement
renders any reliance on epistemological or hybrid philosophical
approaches to factual causation pernicious.
In stark contrast to the hybrid philosophical approach and the
outcome in Borel, courts deciding recent toxic tort cases exhibit
over-reliance on the purely ontological approach to cause and ef-
fect, which is impenetrably nested in linearity or traceability
theories. fllustrative of this approach to causation is Koehn v.
Ayres.9 In Koehn, plaintiffs were subsequent purchasers of land
that previously had been subject to an oil, gas, and mineral lease
owned by Texaco Exploration and Production Company and later
by North Central Oil Company.92 Under the lease, Texaco was
permitted to place a saltwater disposal pit on the land.93 The pit
was used for the disposal of saltwater from 1936 to the late
1960s.94 The plaintiffs alleged that the pit was used for the dis-
posal of unauthorized hazardous oil field wastes. Among other
harms, plaintiffs alleged personal injuries resulting from expo-
89. Expert testimony is indispensable to the preparation and execution of a toxic tort
case. See Stubbs v. City of Rochester, 124 N.E. 137, 140 (N.Y. 1919) (relying on expert tes-
timony of a bacteriologist of the City of Rochester who analyzed samples of water from the
City's water supply and discovered the existence of bacteria that could cause typhoid fe-
ver). In Stubbs, defendant's experts testified that other possible causes apart from water
could have caused the cases of typhoid reported in the area. Id.
90. Professor Erica Beecher-Monas notes that, under the Frye test for admissibility of
expert testimony, for nearly seventy years courts have relied on the general acceptance
standard that involved determining whether the expert's conclusions had achieved con-
sensus in the expert's field. See Erica Beecher-Monas & Edgar Garcia-Rill, The Law and
the Brain: Judging Scientific Evidence of Intent, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCEss 243, 244-45
(1999). She states that aier the United States Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), "difficult as it may be ... requir-
ing judges to evaluate the validity of proffered evidence is a vast improvement over merely
counting scientific noses to determine admissibility." Beecher-Monas & Garcia-Rill, supra,
at 244-45.
91. 26 F. Supp. 2d 953 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
92. The defendant, Ayres, had received the property, subject to the oil, gas, and min-
eral lease. Id. at 954.
93. Id. at 955.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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sure to hazardous substances that leaked from the saltwater pit
into the groundwater under the property."
In response, defendants moved for summary judgment, claim-
ing that plaintiffs could not "prove either that they were exposed
to any hazardous substance in the saltwater disposal pit or that
their alleged personal injuries were medically caused by exposure
to any substance in the pit."97 On the latter issue, plaintiffs sub-
mitted reports from two experts, both of whom made generalized
statements about the link between some toxins alleged to be in
the pit and various illnesses complained of by plaintiffs.9" The
court determined that the reports made by the two experts did
not create a genuine issue of material fact for the jury.99 This de-
termination was premised on the court's observation that plain-
tiffs' experts did not conduct examinations, consider plaintiffs'
medical histories, or "offer any substantiated conclusions about
the medical probability that these plaintiffs' injuries were caused
in whole or in part by exposure to environmental toxins."0 0 The
court held that a plaintiff, as a matter of law, fails to establish a
causal link between toxic exposure and injury when the plaintiff
does not present an "opinion from at least one [expert who testi-
fies to] a reasonable medical probability" about the causal nexus
between the events.' This holding is significant because it sig-
nals the existence of an additional substantive requirement to
proffer scientific and medical testimony on issues of factual cau-
sation in order to survive a motion for summary judgment.0 2 This
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 956.
99. Id. For a discussion of legal sufficiency, see infra Part III.
100. Koehn, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 956.
101. Id.
102. Plaintiffs can easily find themselves unable to procure expert scientific testimony
regarding a positive link between exposure and injury because many agents are not the
subject of epidemiological studies. This is true, not because the agent is not worth study-
ing, but rather because these studies are expensive or such exposure has never occurred or
been observed prior to litigation. See Erica Beecher-Monas, A Ray of Light for Judges
Blinded by Science: Triers of Science and Intellectual Due Process, 33 GA. L. REV. 1047,
1090-92 (1999).
[Riequiring that all the information gaps be filled in order to go forward is
not only a scientific impossibility, but it also places a perverse disincentive on
manufacturers' investment in safety testing. Because any information gained
from research may be used against the manufacturer in litigation, a mini-
mum of evidence is produced. Neither industry nor government adequately
funds research on potentially toxic substances. No toxicity data exist for
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decision presents courts with a new path to dispose of toxic tort
claims in the nascent stages of litigation. Under the Koehn stan-
dard, a plaintiff unable to proffer expert testimony at the motions
phase will be ejected from court with prejudice. The question re-
mains whether a majority of the courts will venture down this
path.10
3
Similarly, in Herrington v. Leaf River Forest Products, Inc.,1 4
the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's grant of
summary judgment citing a lack of sufficient evidence to create a
nearly eighty percent of the chemicals in use. There simply is no incentive for
manufacturers to produce evidence that may eventually be used against them
in court.
Id. at 1090-91.
103. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Citgo Ref. & Chem. Co., [Nov. 25, 1998] 13 Toxics L. Rep.
(BNA) 809 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 3, 1998). The trial court in the same district as Koehn refused to
require plaintiffs to present expert testimony in order to survive a motion for summary
judgment. Id. at 810. The plaintiffs worked in defendant's refinery in Corpus Christi,
Texas, when an explosion occurred during the workday. Id. The explosion caused a release
of hydrogen fluoride at the plant. Id. Several plaintiffs claimed exposure to the toxic sub-
stance. Id. The injuries complained of by plaintiffs included respiratory and gastrointesti-
nal ailments. Id. The plaintiffs, however, could not present a medical or scientific expert to
provide testimony of a positive link between their injuries and their exposure to the de-
fendant's release of hydrogen fluoride. Id. As such, the plaintiffs decided to present lay
evidence of exposure by offering testimony about the fire, the explosion, and the adverse
health ailments each plaintiff suffered from shortly after the catastrophe. Id.
The judge determined that the lay testimony was sufficient to establish a prima facie
case on the issue of causation and gave the case to the jury. Id. The defendant presented
expert evidence to the jury that undermined plaintiffs' assertions that their injuries were
caused by release of hydrogen fluoride after the explosion. Id. Defendant's experts testified
that the release of hydrogen fluoride after the explosion was insufficient to cause the ad-
verse health effects alleged, because the vegetation surrounding the defendant's facility
showed no damage. Id. The defendant's experts persuaded the jury that the release of the
hydrogen fluoride was not the cause of the plaintiffs' injuries. Id.
Both parties relied upon observation-based theories to present their respective versions
of the case, but the jury was most persuaded by the defendant's medical and scientific ex-
perts whose epistemological opinions were cloaked in ontological cloth. Id. Defendant's ex-
perts provided the following theory: because vegetation surrounding the plant remained
unharmed, then humans could not be harmed by the same exposure. Id. The jury's verdict
fails to account for the exposure witnessed by plaintiffs, and the observation of the injuries
that ensued shortly after exposure. Id.
One positive result from Aguilar is the trial judge's decision to refrain from unbalanced
judicial activism in applying standards of legal sufficiency and prematurely disposing of
claims asserting injury from toxic exposures. Aguilar does not represent the trend of un-
balanced judicial activism in the areas of admissibility of expert testimony and the de
facto requirement for expert witnesses to hurdle virtually insurmountable standards for
legal sufficiency in toxic tort litigation. Aguilar is an atypical legal sufficiency case in toxic
tort litigation because it represents a departure from the mainstream cases that require
toxic tort plaintiffs to satisfy rigorous standards which routinely eclipse the attainable re-
quirement of presenting a genuine issue of material fact.
104. 733 So. 2d 774 (Miss. 1999).
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question of fact for the jury. °5 The Mississippi Supreme Court
held that the plaintiffs medical or scientific evidence did not meet
the standard for legal sufficiency because the evidence was based
upon general observations." 6 The plaintiff contended that "cir-
cumstantial evidence is sufficient to establish causation. Circum-
stantial evidence consists of evidence of a fact, or a set of facts,
from which the existence of another fact may reasonably be in-
ferred."' ° The plaintiff presented the following unrebutted evi-
dence: she lived downstream of defendant's company; she con-
tracted Hodgkin's disease after defendant released dioxin into the
waters that carried fish subsequently caught and eaten by plain-
tiff over a period of six years; scientific testimony that defendant
placed dioxin in the water; and medical testimony based upon di-
oxin contamination literature.0 ° Using this circumstantial evi-
dence, plaintiff asserted that she developed her disease after her
exposure to the fish and the water from the Leaf River."0 9 The
court concluded that observation and inference were no longer
persuasive in the determination of legal sufficiency."0 The court
reasoned that medical and scientific evidence and opinion are re-
quired to establish a question of fact on the factual causation
element,"' ignoring the hybrid philosophical approach in the
analysis of factual causation.
Koehn and Herrington represent the general trend in toxic tort
105. Id. at 779-80. ("[We must address the burden of proof required to withstand
summary judgment when the theory of recovery [in a contamination action] is negligence
and the damages asserted are physical injuries."). Id. at 777.
106. Id. at 779.
107. Id. at 777 (internal citations omitted).
108. Id. at 776, 778.
109. Id. at 776.
110. Id. at 779; see David M. Benjamin, Elements of Causation in Toxic Tort Litigation,
14 J. LEGAL MED. 153, 160-61 (1993). Benjamin summarizes an article in Trial News and
states that
the judiciary has already abandoned its traditional role and, spurred on by a
glut of complicated toxic tort cases, embarked on a type of "judicial activism"
that has involved the "aggressive use of summary judgment," a "growing re-
fusal of federal trial and appellate courts to honor jury verdicts' for plaintiffs,
an 'increasing willingness of the federal courts to develop and apply substan-
tive rules of law in derogation of state rules more favorable to the victim,'"
and "the use of the federal constitution to invalidate state law principles
thought to be unfair or damaging to manufacturers."
See id.
111. Herrington, 733 So. 2d at 779 (holding that the plaintiff "had no medical or scien-
tific evidence that her diseases were caused by dioxins or other chemicals of the kind dis-
charged by [defendants]").
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decisions that conclude, as a matter of law, that plaintiffs do not
satisfy the standard for legal sufficiency when they proffer evi-
dence that tends to rely on observation and perception of related
events to establish factual causation. 112 As such, these courts, in a
sweep of unbalanced judicial activism, close the doors to episte-
mology as a means to measure factual causation as well as to le-
gitimate opportunities for toxic tort plaintiffs to satisfy the in-
creased proof requirements of factual causation.
B. Judicial Treatment of Factual Causation in Toxic Tort
Litigation
Generally, there are three tests courts rely on to evaluate fac-
tual causation in toxic tort cases. Legal sufficiency standards are
keenly relevant in the evaluation of factual causation because the
standard dictates the kind and amount of evidence that a plaintiff
must proffer to survive the motion phases of toxic tort cases."
Toxic exposure claims are usually disposed of at the summary
judgment stage for lack of sufficient evidence to support a finding
that a genuine issue of material fact exists to warrant submission
of the case to a jury." Plaintiffs stand a better chance of meeting
legal sufficiency standards if they know which factual causation
112. See Koehn v. Ayres, 26 F. Supp. 2d 953, 957 (S.D. Tex. 1998); Herrington, 733 So.
2d at 779.
113. Legal sufficiency is an elusive standard. It is safe to conclude that the standard for
legal sufficiency varies from case to case, and its satisfaction depends, in part, on the pen-
chant of a court to require a plaintiff to meet relaxed or rigorous standards. See discussion
infra Part III.
114. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (stating that "summary
judgment is proper 'if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admis-
sions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law"
(citations omitted)). In Celotex, the Supreme Court relied on plain language to analyze
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). Id. The Supreme Court stated, "[the rule] mandates
the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion
against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an ele-
ment essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof
at trial." Id. The Court further stated:
there can be "no genuine issue as to any material fact," since a complete fail-
ure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. The moving party is "entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law" because the nonmoving party has failed to
make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to
which she has the burden of proof.
Id. at 323.
20021
900 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:875
tests are followed in various jurisdictions. While not exhaustive,
the general-specific causation test, the general-specific causation
plus test, and the frequency-regularity-proximity test are repre-
sentative of those that courts employ to resolve factual causation
issues in toxic tort litigation.
1. General-Specific Causation
The general-specific test is a two-pronged analysis that re-
quires a plaintiff to show that the toxic substance to which she
was exposed was capable of causing the kind of injury that she
manifests." 5 To satisfy the general-specific causation test, the
plaintiff must then demonstrate that the harm she suffered was
of the same type of injury that results from exposure to the toxic
substance." 6
An application of this test can be seen in Earl v. Cryovac."7
Earl is a typical case representing the two-pronged approach to
establishing factual causation in toxic exposure cases. James Earl
worked as a meat packer"' and "alleged that his lungs were
[damaged at work after] he was exposed.., to vapors emitted
from a plastic film manufactured by [defendant]."119 In support of
his theory, plaintiff presented the testimony of three experts:
plaintiffs treating physician, an industrial hygienist, and a re-
search professor with substantial experience in chemical technol-
115. See Daniel A. Farber, Toxic Causation, 71 MINN. L. REV. 1219, 1227 (1987) (de-
scribing the general causation prong as the first causation problem). Professor Farber ex-
plains that plaintiffs have to establish that "the chemical involved is capable of causing
the type of harm from which the plaintiff suffers." Id. Farber opines that "medical theory
is relatively unhelpful in filling gaps in the factual picture... [because] [many toxic sub-
stances are relatively novel... [such that] sufficient evidence concerning health effects is
not likely to be available for the foreseeable future." Id. at 1227-28.
116. Id. In the same article, Professor Farber describes the specific causation prong as
the second causation problem. He states, "the other problem relating to proof of causation
is that of establishing that, given that the toxic substance in question can cause harm of
the type suffered by the plaintiff, the plaintiffs harm did in fact result from such exposure.
Id. at 1228.
117. 772 P.2d 725 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984). Cryovac is a division of the infamous W.R.
Grace Co., a firm that found itself entangled in the Woburn water contamination case
where plaintiffs alleged that their children and other family members developed leukemia
and other illnesses after ingesting, inhaling, and absorbing well water allegedly contami-
nated by, among others, another Grace subsidiary. See generally JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL
AcTION (1996) (describing the litigation of the Woburn contamination case).
118. Earl, 772 P.2d at 729.
119. Id. at 726.
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ogy. 120 All three experts corroborated and supported plaintiffs
theory that the plastic used in the meat packing process, when
heated to boiling temperatures in a low temperature room, cre-
ated a fog and vapors that were harmful when inhaled.'
The trial court "held that the plaintiff.., failed to establish a
genuine issue of material fact regarding [factual] causation." 22 To
reach this decision, the trial court implicitly concluded that rea-
sonable minds could not differ "as to the material facts or the in-
ferences to be drawn from those facts."1 23 The general causation
prong required a showing that the toxic substance had the poten-
tial to cause a type of harm alleged by the plaintiff, 24 which, in
this case, was lung disease.1
21
While plaintiffs treating physician had no significant knowl-
edge of lung diseases resulting from heated plastic, he inductively
began his search for the cause of plaintiffs ailment by reviewing
and listening to observations made by the plaintiff. 26 These ob-
servations included noticing that plaintiffs ailment subsided
when he was away from work for extended periods of time.'27
From this information, the treating physician narrowed his
search for a cause to plaintiffs place of employment, where he
discovered the operation of the meat-wrapping machine. 2
The machine's function was to boil plastic in water.129 The com-
bination of the high boiling temperature and the low temperature
of the room produced a vapor or fog that contained chemical par-
ticles, which were later determined, with high probability, to be
harmful if inhaled.3 ° In his search, the treating physician also
discovered "medical literature documenting the existence of
'meatwrapper's asthma' or 'meatwrapper's syndrome,' a chronic
lung disease observed in employees of meatpacking plants and
120. Id. at 728-31.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 731.
123. Id. at 731-32.
124. See Farber, supra note 115, at 1227.
125. Earl, 772 P.2d at 726.
126. Id. at 729.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 729-31.
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butcher shops where plastic bags were cut by a thermal process
known as a 'hot wire.'
131
In concluding that the trial court erroneously granted defen-
dant's motion for summary judgment, the appellate court deter-
mined that plaintiff had established the general causation prong
of factual causation. 132 Plaintiffs expert showed that the medical
literature attributed meat packer's disease to the release of va-
pors during the heating of plastic materials used in meat packing
processes.
133
The second prong of factual causation requires a showing of
specific or particularized causation. 134 Under this prong, the
plaintiff must demonstrate the toxic potential of the substance,
his exposure to the toxic substance, and his particular harm aris-
ing from exposure. 135 The specific causation prong carries a sub-
stantial burden of production, especially if a court misinterprets
the weight that should be placed on the testimony of a treating
physician.'36 Earl represents an equitable balance that can be
struck under the specific causation prong.'37 In fact, if viewed
131. Id. at 729.
132. Id. at 731-32.
133. Id. General causation in toxic exposure cases is usually established by presenting
scientific evidence of probabilistic causation. Beecher-Monas, supra note 102, at 1094-99.
Frequently, epidemiologists or toxicologists are employed to render an opinion about the
association between a toxin and a disease. Id. at 1099. However, "[i]t is important to re-
member that association of agent and disease does not prove causation .... The results of
scientific studies can only tell how frequently exposure would be associated with disease
as a matter of chance. Probabilities help to decide whether an association between two
variables exists." See id. at 1094-95.
134. See Joseph Sanders, From Science to Evidence: The Testimony on Causation in the
Bendectin Cases, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1, 14 (1993) ('Specific causation asks whether exposure
to a substance caused a particular plaintiffs injury.").
135. "In a toxic tort case, the cause in fact is a manifold proof: (1) an exposure to an
identified harmful substance significant enough to activate disease [specific]; ... (3) diag-
nosis of such disease in the plaintiff [specific]; (4) expert opinion that the disease in plain-
tiff is consistent with exposure to the harmful substance [specific]." Elam v. Alcolac, Inc.,
765 S.W.2d 42, 178 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (citing G. Marc Whitehead & Larry D. Espel, Legal
Proof of Causation in Toxic Tort Litigation, 2 ToxIc L. REP. (BNA) 1040 (1988); MICHAEL
DORE, LAW OF Toxic TORTS § 24.03 (1987)).
136. A treating physician usually must testify to a reasonable medical certainty before
his opinion will be admitted into evidence. The standard for reasonable medical certainty
is discussed in Part III. Prior to admission, the judge determines the qualifications of the
expert witness to testify as well as measures the reliability of the experes methodology
that supports her opinion. If the physician passes the judicial gatekeeper, her medical
opinion should be added to plaintiffs quantum of evidence. The judge should then review
plaintiffs entire body of evidence to determine if the standard for legal sufficiency is met.
137. Earl, 772 P.2d at 727.
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properly, the court, when deciding on the existence of a genuine
issue of material fact, should consider that a treating physician's
opinion about the causal relationship between exposure and in-
jury is not discredited merely because his opinion is not docu-
mented in scientific literature.3 8
Thus, for specific causation, the standard of reasonable medical
certainty must be viewed differently, for purposes of legal suffi-
ciency, than its counterpart in general causation and the stan-
dard for legal certainty.'39 In the latter, scientists study popula-
tions, associations between exposure and disease, and statistical
probabilities, while in the former, physicians rely on the case
method to accomplish a medical treatment objective, which is to
cure or prevent harm to a patient. 4 ° For example, the Earl court
found the treating physician's testimony about the worsening of
his patient's symptoms and physical condition while at work ver-
sus his patient's improved physical condition away from work
compelling specific causation evidence that was consistent with
the general causation evidence proffered by previous scientific
expert witnesses." The plaintiff demonstrated a similarity be-
tween his lung disease and the documented diseases in the medi-
cal literature." The Earl court weighed the quantum of scientific
and medical evidence to support its conclusion that a genuine is-
138. Id. at 727-28. Professor Beecher-Monas explains that:
no matter how persuasive epidemiological or toxicological studies may be,
they do not show individual, specific causation although they might enable a
probabilistic judgment about the association between a particular chemical
exposure and human disease on a population level. This clarifies an impor-
tant consideration underlying any scientific evidence: attributing causation
for a particular individual is not a scientific but a legal finding.
Beecher-Monas, supra note 102, at 1098-99.
This author disagrees with the latter conclusion presented by Professor Beecher-
Monas, only to the extent that it may imply that a medical professional cannot provide
testimonial evidence of differential diagnoses, which point to legitimate, potential causes
of plaintiffs injuries. However, the ultimate point of her statement elucidates that uncer-
tainty remains regarding specific causation even after probabilistic evidence of association
is admitted. Professor Beecher-Monas concludes: "[elven if epidemiologists and toxicolo-
gists are able to identify correlations between exposure to a given chemical and a disease,
their summary statistical statements apply only to the group studied, not to the individual
members of the group." Id. at 1099.
139. See id. at 1102-03.
140. Id.
14L Earl, 772 P.2d at 733.
142. Id.
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sue of material fact was established for the factual causation ele-
ment.
143
Unfortunately, many courts presiding over toxic tort cases do
not treat scientific and medical evidence in a cumulative fashion
on the issue of factual causation.M Instead, these courts require
scientists and medical professionals, separately and individually,
to link, with unreasonably heightened certainty, an agent to a
disease, and specifically to plaintiffs disease.'45 The Earl court
properly viewed the scientific and medical evidence as cumulative
and symbiotic when deciding that a genuine issue of material fact
existed because scientists themselves base their opinions on mul-
tiple confirmatory studies in different disciplines, not just on one
study.'46 The Earl court's decision to allow the case to move for-
ward is indicative of the balanced application of the hybrid phi-
losophical approach within the general-specific causation test.
2. General-Specific Causation Plus
This test closely approximates the first test. In addition to the
proofs required in the first test, however, this test can alter the
type and amount of proof that would normally be considered ade-
quate under the general-specific causation test.'47 The plus test
equates the specific causation prong of the factual causation ele-
ment in toxic tort cases with the epidemiological term, causality
assessment.' This causality assessment is derived from the ap-
plication of the Bradford Hill factors, a "set of criteria widely used
by epidemiologists in studying" the causal relationship between
exposure to toxins and disease.'49 These factors include: (1) the
143. Id. at 732-34.
144. See, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1997).
145. Id.
146. See Earl, 772 P.2d at 732-34; Beecher-Monas, supra note 102, at 1096.
147. See Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 714-15.
148. See TIMMRECK, supra note 23, at 334.
149. Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 718. In addition to showing general causation, expert tes-
timony of an association between an agent and a disease along with proof that the associa-
tion is statistically significant, a plaintiff, under the general-specific causation plus test,
must also make a causality assessment. A causality assessment has two elements, neces-
sary and sufficient. The necessary element "refers to the idea that a certain [toxin or
agent] must always be present and precede an effect [or disease]." TIMMERECK, supra note
23, at 334. The disease or effect can be the result of one or many existing toxins or agents.
The sufficient element refers to the idea that a certain toxin or agent inevitably produces
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strength of association;5 ' (2) consistency;' 5' (3) specificity;'52 (4)
temporality;'53 (5) biological gradient;14 (6) plausibility;55 (7) con-
gruence;'56 (8) experiment; 5" and (9) analogy. 5 ' If the plaintiff
an effect or disease or at least initiates the effect or disease. Id. A toxin or agent has to be
present in sufficient amount to cause a disease or effect. The causality assessment re-
quires plaintiffs experts to observe the variables or occurrences not actively changed by
the epidemiologists as well as the variables or occurrences that are changed for the pur-
pose of the study. See id. The trouble with judicial reliance on causality assessments is the
invariable disagreement in the scientific community about which factors are useful to ren-
dering a causality assessment. See GARY D. FRIEDMAN, PRIMER OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 184 (3d
ed. 1987).
150. The strength of the association shows that a given factor makes some disease or
disease outbreak more likely to be due to the presence of one factor more than to other fac-
tors or events and it occurs at a relatively high level or in high numbers. TIMMRECK, supra
note 23, at 335. The strength of the association factor appears to hold much interest for
the Havner court because the court placed a heavy burden on the plaintiff, not only to
show an association between the drug and the disease, but to show a stronger association
between the drug and the disease as compared to some other toxin and the disease. See
Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 720. In essence, the plaintiff has to quell the uncertainty that pre-
sents itself when at least tvo possible toxins can produce one disease. Id. This conclusion
places the plaintiff in a profoundly unfair position to establish legal certainty and shows
scientific certainty through causality assessments.
151. Consistency is demonstrated when the same variables, factors, or events appear
over and over in different circumstances and have the same repeated association with a
disease. Hawner, 953 S.W.2d at 718 n.2.
152. Specificity means that the toxin or agent is observed to be associated with one or
just a few diseases or effects rather than with a wide variety of diseases. For example, ex-
posure to asbestos is associated with the diseases asbestosis and mesothelioma. See
FRIEDMAN, supra note 149, at 186.
153. Temporality means the logical exposure to an agent that precedes the onset of dis-
ease. See Elizabeth A. Stundtner, Proving the Causation in Toxic Tort Cases: T-Cell Stud-
ies As Epidemiological and Particular Evidence, 20 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 335, 347
(1993).
154. Biological gradient measures the virility of the toxin and its ability to cause a dis-
ease, and the level of susceptibility of the host. The above definition is characterized by the
dose-response relationship. For example, the fact that moderate cigarette smokers have a
lung cancer death rate intermediate between nonsmokers and heavy smokers is consid-
ered evidence that cigarette smoking causes lung cancer. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 149,
at 184.
155. Plausibility means that association should be proved to be causal based on current
biological, medical, epidemiological, and scientific knowledge. Logical analysis based on
new knowledge should not interfere with or restrict obvious and common sense causal in-
ferences. The Havner court mentioned plausibility, but it did not apply the exact plausibil-
ity principles when it decided to grant defendant's motion for summary judgment on the
issue of factual causation. See Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 729-30.
156. Congruence replaces the term coherence in causality assessment. Congruence is
evidence of causality when the association fits within existing knowledge and the observa-
tions and logical conclusions make scientific sense.
157. Experiment is scientific evidence of causality when knowledge and inferences
about the association are based upon research that substantially support or give weight to
the causal nature of the association.
158. See id. at 718 n.2. Analogy means that where associations are similar and have
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uses admissible data from epidemiological studies to demonstrate
a relative risk of greater than two, or alternatively termed a dou-
bling of the risk, by relying on the factors that make up a causal-
ity assessment, the plaintiff will have established sufficient evi-
dence on the specific causation prong."9 In addition to altering
the specific causation prong, the plus test requires the plaintiff to
present expert testimony, with reasonable medical certainty, that
other plausible causes of the injury or condition could be ne-
gated.16 This negation or exclusion evidence is derived from
Judge Weinstein's conclusion in In re "Agent Orange" Products
Liability Litigation.6' The Agent Orange court held that the
plaintiffs were required to offer evidence that causation was more
than fifty percent probable, and that the plaintiffs' experts were
required to rule out myriad other possible causes of the veterans'
afflictions.'62
Judicial examples of the causality assessment and negation re-
quirements, through the application of the Bradford Hill factors
and the Weinstein elimination of other possible causes model, are
found in Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Havner.'63 In Hav-
ner, the Supreme Court of Texas was faced with a jury verdict
and a court of appeals decision affirming a judgment in favor of
plaintiffs who alleged that their infant's limb reduction birth de-
fect was caused by the mother's ingestion of the prescription drug
Bendectin.'64 The Havners based their case on products liability
principles of negligence, design defects, and marketing defects.'65
The Supreme Court of Texas concentrated its efforts on analyzing
the admissibility of purely scientific expert evidence, the role of
epidemiological studies in establishing general and specific cau-
sation, and the role of statistics in substantiating scientific con-
been shown to be causal, then the transfer of knowledge should be useful and by analogy
the association under study can be evaluated as being causal.
159. See id. at 715-18.
160. Id. at 720.
161. 611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
162. Id. at 1262-63.
163. 953 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1997).
164. Id. at 709. Bendectin was formulated by Merrell Dow and its predecessors and
marketed in the United States from 1957 to 1983. Id. at 708. Because of concerns about
birth defects, more than thirty studies on Bendectin have been conducted and published.
Id. Although the Food and Drug Administration concluded that Bendectin did not increase
the risk of birth defects, Merrell Dow withdrew the drug from the market in 1983. Id. See
Benjamin, supra note 110, at 155; Sanders, supra note 134, at 7, 18.
165. Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 708.
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clusions.'66 However, the Havner court failed to analyze the ra-
tionales for its following conclusions: a physician, as opposed to a
scientist, is in no position to infer specific causation;"' "the scien-
tific community would not accept as methodologically sound a
'study' by" a physician reporting on specific causation;168 and the
development of a purported new rule that creates a substantive
requirement that plaintiffs' experts negate other plausible causes
of injury with reasonable medical certainty.169
Merrell Dow challenged the Havners' causation evidence in the
forms of a motion for summary judgment,'7" a motion in limine,171
and a motion for directed verdict. 72 The Supreme Court of
Texas's acceptance of defendant's writ of error brought plaintiffs'
causation evidence back into the spotlight. The supreme court
recognized that several courts have relied upon the general-
specific test for causation, but it reasoned that the requirement to
balance a plaintiff's right to compensation for injury with a de-
fendant's right to be free from liability in the absence of a pre-
ponderance of the evidence required more. 73 The "more" the
166. See id. at 711, 713, 714-24.
167. Id. at 719.
168. Id. at 719-20.
169. Id. at 720.
170. Id. In its motion for summary judgment, Merrell Dow contended that scientifically
reliable evidence that Bendectin causes limb reduction birth defects or that it caused Kelly
Havner's birth defect was absent. Merrell Dow attacked the Havners' claims of both gen-
eral and specific causation. Id.
171. Id. at 709. In its motion in limine-better known today as a Daubert hearing-
Merrell Dow sought to exclude those plaintiffs' experts who would testify and provide both
general and specific causation evidence. Id.
172. Id. In its motion for a directed verdict, Merrell Dow asserted that plaintiffs did not
establish a prima facie case to support their theories of liability, especially the element of
general causation. Id.
173. Id. at 718 (noting that general causation evidence is derived from frequency data
used to assess adverse effects in general populations and this evidence cannot indicate the
actual cause of a given individual's disease). Judge Owen stated:
[Tihe law must balance the need to compensate those who have been injured
by the wrongful actions of another with the concept deeply imbedded in our
jurisprudence that a defendant cannot be found liable for an injury unless the
preponderance of the evidence supports cause in fact. The use of scientifically
reliable epidemiological studies and the requirement of more than a doubling
of the risk strikes a balance between the needs of our legal system and the
limits of science.
Id.
The evidentiary problem this conclusion raises is that only scientists who study popula-
tions, as opposed to physicians who actually treat individual patients, will be allowed to
testify on the specific causation prong, because a treating physician will not be in the posi-
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Havner court spoke of is the requirement that plaintiffs' experts
negate other plausible causes that could result in plaintiffs' injury
or condition. 1
74
Accordingly, the general-specific causation plus test mandates
that inferences about specific causation cannot be drawn from
epidemiological studies and, therefore, plaintiffs can never meet
legal sufficiency standards with only this type of evidence. 75 In
order to support the inference of specific causation, plaintiffs
must present a causality assessment that shows a doubling of the
risk created by defendant's conduct precipitating exposure.'76
Without this causal assessment, plaintiffs only have epidemiol-
ogical studies that may be part of the evidence supporting a find-
ing of factual causation, but which do not satisfy the standard of
legal sufficiency.177 The Supreme Court of Texas rejected the dou-
ble use of epidemiological studies to support plaintiffs' theory on
both the general causation prong and the specific causation
prong.178 In the Havner court's view, adding a "doubling of the
risk" requirement to evidence of epidemiological studies would
satisfy the legal sufficiency standard for factual causation. 79 A
doubling of the risk or a relative risk greater than 2.0 indicates
that people in the exposed population are twice as likely to con-
tract a disease than those people in the unexposed population.'80
With each increase in the exposed population and no change in
the unexposed population, a court may conclude that the defen-
dant's conduct incrementally increases the exposed population's
risk of contracting the disease.'8' Thus, the Havner court suggests
that the doubling of the risk, although a statistical determination,
is equivalent to the preponderance of the evidence standard that
contemplates an either/or conclusion.'82
The disappointing result in relying on the "doubling of the risk"
tion to perform statistical analyses on data when she observes, evaluates, and treats only
the one injured plaintiff. See id.
174. Id. at 718-20.
175. Id. at 720.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 721.
180. Id. at 722.
181. Id. at 722-23.
182. Id.
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analysis is that a plaintiff who is really injured as a result of ex-
posure to defendant's toxic agent may not recover if she cannot
demonstrate a doubling of the risk to the population. This over-
reliance on population fails to account for the possibility that the
plaintiff was injured by the toxic exposure. The "doubling of the
risk" requirement is especially pernicious in light of the Havner
court's decision to reject all physicians' opinions as scientifically
unreliable as a matter of law."3 From this conclusion, plaintiffs
are foreclosed from proffering potentially reliable evidence that
would properly carry great weight with the fact finder on the spe-
cific causation prong of factual causation.
The Havner court would only allow an inference about specific
causation to be drawn if the plaintiff supported the inference by
conducting a causality assessment." This causality assessment
is based upon factors that even epidemiologists cannot agree on
in terms of their usefulness or effectiveness outside the range of
population analyses.'85 In spite of these opinions, the Havner
court looked favorably on the Bradford Hill factors even though
they have been criticized as only being related to the strength of
probabilistic evidence of populations and as having almost no ap-
plicability to legal conclusions about specific causation. 6 In its
rule of law statement for factual causation, the Havner court in-
discriminately chose two or three factors among the nine listed by
Bradford Hill and arbitrarily assigned legal, substantive signifi-
cance to them with only scant discussion of their relevance to the
specific causation prong.87 For example, the Havner court honed
in on plausibility and elevated this factor to the status of a pre-
requisite for meeting the standard of legal sufficiency.18 Thus,
the Supreme Court of Texas held:
To raise a fact issue on causation and thus to survive legal suffi-
ciency review, a claimant must do more than simply introduce into
evidence epidemiological studies that show a substantially elevated
risk. A claimant must show that he or she is similar to those in the
studies. This would include proof that the injured person was ex-
posed to the same substance, that the exposure or dose levels were
183. Id. at 730.
184. Id. at 718-19.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 719.
187. See id. at 720.
188. Id.
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comparable to or greater than those in the studies, that the exposure
occurred before the onset of injury, and that the timing of the onset
of injury was consistent with that experienced by those in the
study.... Further, if there are other plausible causes of the injury or
condition that could be negated, the plaintiff must offer evidence ex-
cluding those causes with reasonable certainty.1
8 9
To require a plaintiff to present evidence excluding other plau-
sible causes of the injury to a reasonable medical certainty for
purposes of meeting the standard for legal sufficiency is akin to a
court dismissing every claim for toxic exposure injuries. Plaintiffs
are not the manufacturers, dealers, or retailers of toxic sub-
stances and therefore are not in a superior position to monitor the
plausible causes and effects that a toxic substance will have on
human health. To do so will place an unrealistic burden on plain-
tiffs.
According to the test proposed by the Supreme Court of Texas,
a plaintiff who alleges injury from toxic exposure must become
the prognosticator of plausible causes. 9 ° This requirement exists
in Texas even though defendants, who are the experts at market-
ing and distributing toxic products, allegedly cannot deduce the
effects of their own products on people or the environment. Sev-
eral of the Bradford Hill factors listed by the supreme court are
either explicit or implicit in the general-specific causation test,
but the additional "plus" burden placed on plaintiffs in Texas to
exclude plausible causes to a reasonable medical certainty
plunges the scales of justice in favor of defendants. The Havner
decision insures that virtually no plaintiff in Texas will meet the
standard for legal sufficiency on the factual causation element in
a toxic tort case. This stringent standard cannot achieve the goals
of the tort system and the fairness that must be struck between
possible wrongful actors and definitively injured plaintiffs. This
decision also fails to account for the legal policy mechanisms that
provide protections for both plaintiffs and defendants. These
mechanisms include the availability of insurance, the role that
distributive costs play in business development, and the judge-
made principle of proximate or legal cause.
Furthermore, the Havner court's decision only accounts for the
efficient cause of an effect or outcome by concentrating on the
189. Id.
190. Id.
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possible wrongdoer. First, the Havner court should have consid-
ered whether the physical cause, the agent or toxin, contributed
to the harm. Second, the court should have realized that the de-
fendant indeterminacy problem should not have shielded a
wrongful actor completely to the detriment of the injured plain-
tiff. Finally, the Havner court should have considered the associa-
tion the defendants had to both the physical cause and the in-
jured party for purposes of establishing a link or nexus based
upon a hybrid philosophical approach to show factual causation.
While the general-specific causation test implicitly considers the
association between physical causes and injured parties, the fre-
quency, regularity, and proximity test makes explicit use of the
association.
3. Frequency, Regularity, and Proximity
The frequency, regularity, and proximity test is a new rule gov-
erning the specific causation prong of medical causation adopted
by the New Jersey Supreme Court in cases in which a plaintiff
has been exposed to a variety of toxic products and cannot attrib-
ute an injury to a specific product or defendant.'9' The test does
not alter the requirement for plaintiffs to demonstrate general
causation, i.e., that a toxin is capable of causing the disease com-
plained of by plaintiffs (causal nexus). 92 However, the frequency,
191. See, e.g., James v. Bessemer Processing Co., 714 A.2d 898 (N.J. 1998). In New Jer-
sey toxic tort cases, courts refer to the factual causation element as medical causation.
Thus, under these types of cases, a plaintiff must prove medical causation-that the plain-
tiffs injuries were proximately caused by exposure to the defendant's product. Proof of
medical causation is a requirement of cases involving occupational exposure to toxic mate-
rials as well as of cases involving asbestos exposure. To prove medical causation in New
Jersey, a plaintiff must show that the exposure to each defendant's product was a substan-
tial factor in causing or exacerbating the disease. Because of the extraordinary and unique
burdens facing plaintiffs who seek to prove causation in toxic tort litigation, specifically,
long latency periods, multiple products, and multiple defendants, New Jersey courts rec-
ognize that satisfying the substantial factor test is a formidable task. Accordingly, the
New Jersey Supreme Court has held that strong circumstantial evidence would suffice to
establish that defendant was a substantial factor in causing plaintiffs injury. Id. at 908-
10. Specifically, the court adopted the frequency, regularity, and proximity test to estab-
lish liability in the multiple defendant asbestos and occupational exposure contexts. Thus,
in order to prove that exposure to a specific defendant's product was a substantial factor in
causing or exacerbating plaintiffs disease, the plaintiff is required to prove an exposure of
sufficient frequency, with regularity of contact, and with the product in close proximity to
the plaintiff. Id.
192. See id. at 911.
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regularity, and proximity test does relax the prevailing specific
causation tests, namely, the probabilistic evidence of specific cau-
sation under the Havner rule or that plaintiffs' injuries are simi-
lar to those in an exposed population.193 The test allows plaintiffs
in asbestos and occupational exposure cases to present
circumstantial, synergistic evidence of the cumulative effect of
exposure to toxins.194 Application of the frequency, regularity, and
proximity test necessarily focuses on the cumulative effects of (1)
exposure over a prolonged period of time; (2) the dosage of
exposure; and (3) the mode of absorption into the human body.195
Application of the frequency, regularity, and proximity test for
specific causation typically arises in asbestos and occupational
exposure cases. One such case is James v. Bessemer Processing
Co."'96 Walter James worked for Bessemer Processing for twenty-
six years as a general laborer in its business of cleaning and re-
conditioning used and empty fifty-five-gallon drums for further
use by the petroleum industry and other chemical manufactur-
ers.' 97 Bessemer used a multi-staged process to clean and recondi-
tion the drums.' The process included uncapping the heads of
the drums, emptying the drums, incinerating residue, sand blast-
193. Id.
194. See id. at 913 (holding that plaintiffs proofs provided sufficient product identifica-
tion with regard to the petroleum defendants to survive summary judgment). Plaintiffs
toxicologists could rely on the physical description of James's co-workers to support his
expert opinion that the fumes and residues described were of petroleum-based products
containing sufficiently high levels of benzene and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs)
to cause James's cancer. Id. Jurors could rely both on that expert testimony and on the
factual testimony of the lay witnesses to determine whether plaintiff proved exposure to
the petroleum-based products. Id. A rational fact finder could also conclude from the co-
workers' testimony that James was frequently, regularly, and proximately exposed to de-
fendants' products containing known carcinogens, and thus could conclude that James's
exposure to the petroleum products of each defendant was a substantial factor in causing
or exacerbating his disease. Id.
195. See id. at 911. With the adoption of the frequency, regularity, and proximity test,
the Bessemer court moved away from the insurmountable obstacles facing the plaintiff,
such as long latency periods, multiple products, and indeterminate defendants, in order to
strike a balance with regard to proof of causation that is fair to both plaintiffs and defen-
dants in view of the almost certain lack of direct scientific proof in toxic tort cases. Id. at
909. The Bessemer court stated that adoption of this new standard is required by the
unique difficulties faced by a plaintiff attempting to establish causation in the toxic tort
context "[slince proof of direct contact is almost always lacking... courts must rely upon
circumstantial proof of sufficiently intense exposure to warrant liability.'" Id. at 901 (quot-
ing Sholtis v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 568 A.2d 1196, 1207 (N.J. Super. 1989)).
196. Id. at 898.
197. Id. at 902-03.
198. Id.
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ing the drums, washing the drums in a nitrate solution, sealing
and testing the drums, rewashing the drums, then drying and
painting the drums.'99 Following this reconditioning, Bessemer
either resold or returned the drums to the suppliers for reuse. °
Plaintiff offered direct lay testimony that during each stage of
the reconditioning process, noxious fumes escaped and exposed
the workers to all types of petroleum products and chemicals.20 '
In addition, plaintiff offered direct lay testimony that her hus-
band performed every job required at the Bessemer plant includ-
ing "cutting the heads off drums; operating the incinerator, sand
blaster, rolling machines, and heading machines; welding and
painting drums; and... cleaning the slop hole."20 2 James was di-
agnosed with stomach cancer in 1989, and he died in 1990 from
carcinoma with metastasis to the liver and peritoneum. °3 James's
widow brought wrongful death and survival actions against Bes-
semer and other defendants.0 4 She alleged that the petroleum
and chemical manufacturers and Bessemer failed to warn her
husband of the dangerous toxicity of the substances in the
drums.0 5 She also alleged that her husband's continuous expo-
sure to those substances caused his illness and death.20 6
Consistent with the trial strategies of toxic tort defendants,
Bessemer and the petroleum and chemical manufacturers were
granted a summary judgment motion on the ground that plaintiff
would be unable to establish that her husband's cancer was
caused by specific products manufactured by specific defen-
dants.207 The appellate division reversed.208 Defendants chal
199. Id.
200. Id.
20L Id. at 904-05.
202. Id. at 903.
203. Id.
204 Id. at 901.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. The language in the trial court's decision is quite telling as to which party is
favored in the toxic tort litigation system. A grant of summary judgment on the ground
that a plaintiff "would be unable to establish that James's cancer was caused by specific
products manufactured by specific defendants" reads like a classic preemptive strike. Id.
Defendants rely and prevail on the obvious argument that no one has yet to prove a direct
causal link between exposure to a toxin and injury. Therefore, because these direct onto-
logical links are impossible to prove, liability should not extend to a defendant engaged in
the manufacture, distribution, or marketing of a toxic chemical.
208. See id.
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lenged the appellate division's reversal of the grant of summary
judgment."9 Thus, the New Jersey Supreme Court had to deter-
mine if a plaintiff could establish proof of specific causation after
applying the frequency, regularity, and proximity test in a toxic
tort failure to warn case,"' even though plaintiffs faced problemsof multiple products and indeterminate defendants. 1
The plaintiff presented expert testimony from a toxicologist
and a medical doctor.21 2 On the general causation prong, the toxi-
cologist's testimony showed that exposure to specific chemicals
contained in petroleum products in the work place were probable
human carcinogens, meaning that they more likely than not
cause cancer. 213 On the specific causation prong, the medical ex-
pert's testimony showed that James "absorbed one or more of
these carcinogens through his gastrointestinal tract and through
his lungs. These chemicals then spread to his stomach causing a
derangement of DNA mechanism such that one or more of the
cells grew in an uncontrolled fashion, clinically known as can-
cer."
214
Before agreeing with the appellate division's decision to apply
209. Id.
210. New Jersey's frequency, regularity, and proximity test was sanctioned by the ap-
pellate division in Sholtis v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 568 A.2d 1196, 1207 (N.J. Super. 1989).
211. Bessemer, 714 A.2d at 902. A finding that plaintiff established factual causation in
this case would mean that the conundrum of the indeterminate defendants and multiple
products would not, as a matter of law, defeat plaintiffs claim for damages based on toxic
exposure. The proof required to meet legal sufficiency may be analogous to what commen-
tators and courts refer to as minimal showings of legal sufficiency and weak preponder-
ance of the evidence standards. However, the author believes that the term best invoked
at this stage of the proceedings is the satisfaction of the standard for legal sufficiency by
reliance on strong circumstantial evidence. This standard requires parties to present
enough evidence to support a decision that reasonable minds could differ as to the mate-
rial facts or the inferences to be drawn from those facts. Accordingly, at the summary
judgment stage in toxic tort litigation, judges should refrain from engaging in oppressive
judicial activism that would undermine equitable principles. The assault on the legal suf-
ficiency standard is best observed by overzealous judges who make credibility determina-
tions that usurp the role of the jury. Instead, judges should hold gatekeepers responsible
for admissibility issues, like qualification and reliability, and decision-makers responsible
for ensuring that genuine issues of material fact reach the jury. The standard of legal suf-
ficiency is abused in favor of defendants when judges supplant what they conclude is be-
lievable with that which reasonable jurors can reasonably disagree after being presented
with admissible expert testimony that supports opposing theories regarding factual causa-
tion.
212. Id. at 905.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 906.
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the frequency, regularity, and proximity test to the specific causa-
tion prong, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated:
By far the most difficult problem for plaintiffs to overcome in toxic
tort litigation is the burden of proving causation. In the typical tort
case, the plaintiff must prove tortious conduct, injury and proximate
cause. Ordinarily, proof of causation requires the establishment of a
sufficient nexus between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiffs
injury. In toxic tort cases, the task of proving causation is invariably
made more complex because of the long latency period of illnesses
caused by carcinogens or other toxic chemicals. [The] fact that ten or
twenty years or more may intervene between the exposure and the
manifestation of disease highlights the practical difficulties encoun-
tered in the effort to prove causation.
21 5
In this statement, the court recognized the inherent advantage
that defendants have in toxic tort litigation because of their
status as indeterminate parties and the tort system's recent reli-
ance on ontological views to substantiate using scientific trace-
ability theories as the only means to establish factual causa-
tion.21
6
To balance the scales between parties to a toxic tort case, the
Bessemer court turned to the frequency, regularity, and proximity
test, which would allow plaintiffs to establish the liability of mul-
tiple defendants. 217 The Bessemer court stated:
[In order to prove that [plaintiffs] exposure to a specific defendant's
toxic product was a substantial factor in causing or exacerbating the
plaintiffs disease, the plaintiff is required to prove "an exposure of
sufficient frequency, with a regularity of contact, and with the prod-
uct in close proximity" to the plaintiff. [S]uch a standard [is] required
by the unique difficulties faced by a plaintiff attempting to establish
causation in the toxic-tort context: "[S]ince proof of direct contact is
almost always lacking... courts must rely upon circumstantial proof
of sufficiently intense exposure to warrant liability."
218
The test limits liability to defendants whose products to which
the plaintiff can demonstrate she was "intensely exposed."212 Re-
215. Id. at 909 (quoting Ayers v. Jackson Township, 525 A.2d 287, 301 (N.J. 1987)).
216. See id.
217. See id. at 901.
218. Id. at 910 (quoting Sholtis v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 568 A.2d 1196, 1207 (N.J. Super.
1989)).
219. See id. The court stressed "that the 'frequency, regularity, and proximity' test
bears no relationship to theories of collective liability that some courts have adopted in
contexts where the specific tortfeasor or tortfeasors that caused the plaintiffs injury can-
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lying on policy principles, the court held that a plaintiff demon-
strates medical causation in an occupational exposure toxic tort
case by satisfying two prongs.2 Plaintiffs must show general
causation by "medical and/or scientific proof of a nexus between
the exposure and the plaintiffs condition," in addition to specific
causation by "factual proof of the plaintiffs frequent, regular, and
proximate exposure to a defendant's product."22' The frequency,
regularity, and proximity test relaxes the specific causation re-
quirement found in both traditional tort cases and toxic tort cases
where courts have chosen to conform to the ontological view of
science and traceability theory to recognize a causal connection
between a toxin, an exposure, and an injury. Instead of requiring
direct traceability, the frequency, regularity, and proximity test
permits reliance on the hybrid philosophical approach to analyz-
ing factual causation, which places weight on observations of an
event. For example, this could involve exposure to a carcinogen
and the expected result or injury that is consistent with exposure
to a toxin.22 2
Of the three tests for factual causation, the frequency, regular-
ity, and proximity test is by far the most advantageous to toxic
exposure plaintiffs. But instead of tipping the scales of justice in
favor of plaintiffs, the frequency, regularity, and proximity test
only begins to contract the unreasonable litigation advantages en-
joyed by defendants under both the general-specific causation and
the general-specific causation plus tests.
not be identified." Id.
220. Id. at 911.
221. Id. Upon applying both prongs of the "frequency, regularity, and proximity test,"
the New Jersey Supreme Court agreed with the appellate division that granting defen-
dant's summary judgment motion was premature. Id. The lay testimony sufficiently ad-
duced that James's employment responsibilities brought him in repeated contact with
various chemicals over a period of twenty-six years. Id. at 901, 912. Furthermore, expert
testimony sufficiently demonstrated that James's cumulative exposure to toxic chemicals
present in the petroleum-based products caused his stomach and liver cancer. Id. at 906.
The court reached this conclusion even though plaintiff could not precisely identify the ex-
act chemical he was exposed to during his employment. Id. at 913. The court did not re-
quire plaintiff to provide such information because the defendants kept no records of the
types of chemicals it shipped in the fifty-five-gallon drums. Id. Because of faulty record
keeping, the court shifted this burden on defendants to prove each was not a party respon-
sible for James's exposure. Id. at 913-14.
222. See id. at 911.
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III. BURDEN OF PROOF FOR CAUSATION IN ToxIc TORT
LITIGATION
In most jurisdictions, a toxic tort plaintiff must hurdle at least
three critical procedural obstacles in order for a toxic tort case to
reach the jury. First, the plaintiff must survive a motion for
summary judgment based upon inadmissibility of expert scientific
and medical testimony.2 23 Second, the plaintiff must survive a
motion for summary judgment based upon lack of sufficient evi-
dence to support a finding of factual causation. 24 Third, the
plaintiff must survive a motion for directed verdict based upon a
failure to prove all elements of a toxic tort claim by a preponder-
ance of the evidence.225 Thus, the toxic tort plaintiff has the bur-
223. "One of the principle purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dis-
pose of factually unsupported claims or defenses." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
323-24 (1986). Justice Rehnquist interpreted the summary judgment rule to require an
adequate time for discovery and, after which, the moving party must come forward with
the basis for the motion and citations to the portions of discovered materials that prove
the absence of any genuine issues of material fact. Id. at 322. Even though the moving
party is required to prove the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, she is not re-
quired to disprove or negate the opponenes claims. Id. at 323. Then, the burden shifts to
the party opposing the motion to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of the
prima facie case. Id. at 322. The party opposing the motion may not rely on the pleadings
or mere denials of the allegations. Id. at 324. Instead, the party must adduce some evi-
dence showing that material facts are in dispute. Id. The party opposing the motion can
adduce such evidence that specific facts present a genuine issue of material fact through
"depositions, affidavits, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file." Id.; see also
Chikovsky v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 832 F. Supp. 341, 346 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (granting defen-
dants motion for summary judgment on the basis that plaintiffs expert's testimony was
inadmissible because the expert's opinion was not based upon scientifically valid princi-
ples or methodology).
224. See Backes v. Valspar 6orp., 783 F.2d 77, 78 (7th Cir. 1986). The court reversed
the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants because an expert
chemist, formerly employed by the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, opined in an
affidavit on behalf of plaintiff that the two wells on plaintiffs property had been contami-
nated and that the plaintiffs children's injuries "might or could have been caused" by
drinking the water. See id. Judge Posner wrote:
[Alt the summary judgment stage, the burden of proof is on the moving party,
in this case the defendant, to show that the outcome of a trial would be a
foregone conclusion because with discovery complete the opposing party has
turned up no evidence of an essential element of his case or defense.
If [the expert] was competent to offer opinion evidence, the plaintiff put in
enough evidence, though only barely so, to defeat a motion for summary
judgment.
Id. at 78-79 (citations omitted).
225. See Elam v. Alcolac, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 42, 174 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
A toxic tort plaintiff, as any other, bears the burden to prove the facts essen-
tial to a prima facie case. The plaintiff also bears the risk of nonpersuasion
and must show by a preponderance, or greater weight, of the evidence that
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den to provide evidence of facts, mostly scientific and medical,
which show a genuine issue of material fact necessary to survive
a motion for summary judgment, and indicate the existence of
factual causation more than the non-existence of causation to
survive a motion for a directed verdict.226
A. Admissibility of Expert Testimony and Factual Causation
Because the issue of factual causation in toxic tort cases is
complex, expert testimony is crucial, especially to those courts
that rely heavily on the ontological approach. Before an expert
can give a scientific or medical opinion about factual causation,
the judge must be satisfied that the witness is qualified to render
an expert opinion.227 Next, the judge must be satisfied that the
subject of the expert's testimony will have evidentiary relevance
and reliability.228 Regarding evidentiary relevance, the trial judge
the injury was the result of the negligence of the defendant. The greater
weight of the evidence does not mean evidence that engenders certainty in
the trier of fact, but which-"when the last word has been spoken in the trial
of a case"--prompts a greater probability of confidence in the evidence of one
party over the other.
Id. at 174-75 (citations omitted).
226. See 1 ROBERT E. SHIELDS, A GUIDE TO Toxic TORTS § 10.01[2][b] (1999). Mr.
Shields notes:
The plaintiff must establish that causation is more probable than not. Courts
have equated this requirement with the determination of a probability ex-
ceeding 50 percent. Moreover, the law approaches the problem of proof in an
all-or-nothing fashion. If the plaintiff establishes that the probability of cau-
sation is at least 51 percent, then the plaintiff is entitled to recover for the
full amount of his damages. On the other hand, if the plaintiff can only estab-
lish that the probability of causation is 49 percent instead of 50 percent, then
the plaintiff does not recover at all.
Id. The Guide discusses the burden of proof and the burden of persuasion as one inte-
grated test or standard for determining both the prima facie case and a jury's belief of the
relative truth based upon its weighing of the evidence presented to support each party's
version of the case. See id. at ch. 10. One author characterized this integration as the col-
lapsing of two burdens into a single haphazard, meaningless standard. Steve Gold, Causa-
tion in Toxic Torts: Burdens of Proof, Standards of Persuasion, and Statistical Evidence,
96 YALE L.J. 376, 384-87 (1986). The single standard does not account for the two-tiered
system of justice requiring prima facie case presentation and then, in the face of a ques-
tion of fact, a balancing or weighing of evidence to arrive at belief probability. See id. at
386.
227. See FED. R. EVID. 702, 703 (governing the admissibility and use of expert witness
testimony in federal court).
228. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589-91 (1993). The
Daubert court held that even though the Frye test was displaced by the Federal Rules of
Evidence in federal cases, that this does not mean
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is obligated to ensure that the expert's testimony is (1) based
upon scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge that will
(2) assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to deter-
mine a fact in issue, and (3) will comport with the requirement of
fit, i.e., the degree to which an expert's testimony is sufficiently
tied to the facts of the case.229 As to evidentiary reliability, the
trial judge must assess the validity of the technique or methodol-
ogy that is the basis for the expert's opinion.23 0 To determine sci-
entific validity, the trial judge must conduct a flexible inquiry
that focuses solely on the technique or methodology used by the
expert, not on the conclusions each generates. 231 Even if the judge
determines that an expert's testimony satisfies evidentiary rele-
vance and reliability, the judge still has the opportunity to ex-
clude such evidence if its probative value is substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.232 Finally, the trial
judge's decision to admit or exclude scientific evidence is subject
only to an abuse of discretion standard of review because the
judge's gatekeeping role falls squarely within evidentiary rul-
ings.233
that the Rules themselves place no limits on the admissibility of purportedly
scientific evidence. Nor is the trial judge disabled from screening such evi-
dence. To the contrary, under the Rules the trial judge must ensure that any
and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but re-
liable.
Id. at 589.
229. See id. at 592; see also FED. R. EVID. 702.
230. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93.
231. Id. at 594-95. The inquiry may be based on whether the technique or methodology
(1) "can be (and has been) tested"; (2) "subjected to peer review and publication"; (3) condi-
tioned upon a "known or potential rate of error"; and (4) generally accepted in the "rele-
vant scientific community." Id. at 593-94. Many factors will bear on the inquiry, but even
though the Court did not presume to set out a definitive checklist or test, it felt that some
general observations were appropriate. Id. However, a trial judge may consider several
more or different specific factors that might bear on the gatekeeping determination. See
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999). The "gatekeeping inquiry must
be 'tied to the facts' of a particular 'case." Id. at 150 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591).
Thus, the Daubert "list of factors was meant to be helpful, not definitive." Id. at 151. In-
deed, the Daubert "factors do not all necessarily apply even in every instance in which the
reliability of scientific testimony is challenged." Id.
232. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595. "Expert evidence can be both powerful and quite mis-
leading because of the difficulty in evaluating it. Because of this risk, the judge in weigh-
ing possible prejudice against probative force under Rule 403 of the present rules exercises
more control over experts than over lay witnesses.'" Id. (quoting Jack B. Weinstein, Rule
702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence Should Not Be Amended: It Is Sound, 138 F.R.D. 631,
632 (1991)).
233. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142 (1997). In Joiner, the Court stated
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Despite the Supreme Court's lengthy treatment of the stan-
dards for admissibility of expert testimony, federal and state trial
courts still retain significant power to either admit or exclude,
consistent with their respective philosophical approaches, expert
testimony on factual causation in toxic tort litigation. For exam-
ple, some state courts still adhere to the general acceptance test
for admissibility of expert testimony;234 while federal trial courts,
since Daubert, have differed substantially in execution of their
gatekeeping role.235 Some courts liberally admit testimony from
qualified experts, while others insist on rigorous scientific verifi-
cation based upon exacting standards. 6 In toxic tort cases, these
gatekeeping determinations are critical, being virtually disposi-
tive of a case when expert testimony is mandatory on the issue of
factual causation. No one admissibility test or application of that
test seems favored by the various courts presiding over toxic tort
cases. This phenomenon creates doubts for toxic tort litigants who
must assess their ability to procure admissible expert testimony
or evidence on the crucial and dispositive issue of factual causa-
tion.
With respect to the admissibility of expert scientific or medical
testimony on the issue of factual causation, the role of the judge is
to decide the relevance and reliability of the testimony, not the
that:
[wihile the Federal Rules of Evidence allow district courts to admit a some-
what broader range of scientific testimony than would have been admissible
under Frye, they leave in place the "gatekeeper" role of the trial judge in
screening such evidence. A court of appeals applying "abuse-of-discretion" re-
view to such rulings may not categorically distinguish between rulings allow-
ing expert testimony and rulings disallowing it.
Id.
234. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (establishing the test
of general acceptance within the scientific community); see also Logerquist v. McVey, 1
P.3d 113, 114 (Ariz. 2000) (discussing Frye and Daubert as applicable to ARIZ. R. EvID.
702); Fishback v. People, 851 P.2d 884, 889 (Colo. 1993) (application of Frye general accep-
tance test to admissibility of novel scientific evidence); Berry v. CSX Transp. Inc., 709 So.
2d 552, 555-57 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (citing to Frye for general acceptance test); Goeb
v. Taraldson, 615 N.W.2d 800 (Minn. 2000) (questioning use of Frye test for novel scientific
evidence instead of Daubert).
235. Compare In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 836 (3d Cir. 1990) (liber-
ally construing the Federal Rules of Evidence to resolve doubt about scientific validity in
favor of admissibility), with Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 902 F.2d 362 (5th Cir.
1990), affd on reh'g, 939 F.2d 1106, 1114-15 (5th Cir. 1991) (using a restrictive view of the
Federal Rules of Evidence and exercising the gatekeeping role to exclude scientific evi-
dence when irrelevant and unreliable).
236. See id.
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correctness or persuasiveness of the expert's conclusion.23 7 How-
ever, many judges overstep the role of gatekeeper by deciding on
the correctness of experts' opinions, with the general results be-
ing orders granting summary judgment in favor of defendants.
Deciding on the correctness of an expert's opinion at the summary
judgment stage presumes that scientists and medical profession-
als know with certainty the answers to factual causation ques-
tions raised in toxic tort cases. It is "unreasonable to conclude
that the subject of scientific testimony must be known to a cer-
tainty; when arguably there are no certainties in science."238 Sci-
entists do not testify to immutable truths; rather, they search for
theories to help explain phenomena.3 9 Thus, for a trial judge to
go beyond the gatekeeping role into the domain of the trier of fact
is a critical mistake that can prove to be fatal to a toxic tort plain-
tiffs case. Trial judges should err on the side of caution when ex-
ercising their gatekeeping role in order to ensure against the im-
proper conversion of an evidentiary determination into a
substantive determination on the issue of factual causation.24 °
At the summary judgment stage, the scientific expert should
not be measured by a standard of believability or persuasion.
Rather, the scientific expert's purpose is to present her theories
on the issue of factual causation and to assist the jury in under-
standing the factual predicates that support her theories. A judge
should not express, through a grant of summary judgment, her
opinion about the correctness of the expert's testimony. Instead,
the judge should remain neutral in spite of her own beliefs about
the persuasiveness or correctness of an expert's opinion because
237. FED. R. EvID. 702, 703.
238. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590.
239. See id.
240. See Robertson v. White, 635 F. Supp. 851 (W.D. Ark. 1986), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom. Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves, 856 F.2d 52 (8th Cir. 1988). "Summary judgment
should be 'cautiously invoked' so that no person will be improperly deprived of his Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial." Id. at 870. The Seventh Amendment provides:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by ajury
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than ac-
cording to the rules of the common law.
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
Thus, it is only when no genuine issue of material fact exists that a federal district
court may grant summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 with-
out violating the Seventh Amendment. See Shore v. Park Lane Hosiery Co., 565 F.2d 815,
819 (2d Cir. 1977).
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the appropriate determiner of believability and persuasiveness is
the trier of fact.
B. Legal Certainty, Reasonable Scientific/Medical Certainty,
and Factual Causation
Unfortunately, the standard for reasonable scientific/medical
certainty24' is not clearly defined in toxic tort jurisprudence. 2
This oversight creates a challenge for litigants, particularly plain-
tiffs, who must rely on scientific and medical testimony to estab-
lish factual causation.24 3 Even more challenging for litigants is
determining the impact that the reasonable medical certainty
standard has on admissibility standards, legal sufficiency stan-
dards, and preponderance of evidence standards.2
In addition, problems arise when courts make vague or unde-
241. The term "reasonable medical certainty," when used generally in this article, will
encompass both scientific and medical testimony. However, the term will be split into
"reasonable scientific certainty" and "reasonable medical certainty" when drawing distinc-
tions between the disciplines of research science (yielding, for example, epidemiological
information) and medical science (relating, for example, to clinical observation and treat-
ment).
242. See Jeff L. Lewin, The Genesis and Evolution of Legal Uncertainty about "Reason-
able Medical Certainty," 57 MD. L. REV. 380, 380 (1998). Professor Lewin begins his article
that "traces the history of the creation and dissemination of the phrase 'reasonable medi-
cal certainty" with the astonishingly appropriate statement that "[a]lthough judges ex-
pect, and sometimes insist, that expert opinions be expressed with 'reasonable medical
certainty,' and although attorneys ritualistically intone the phrase, no one knows what it
means!" Id.
243. The phrase "reasonable medical certainty" has "achieved 'occult' or 'talismanic'
status in the interrogation of medical witnesses" even though the term remains ill defined
with only vague glimpses of legal, scientific, or medical meaning. Id. at 385. "[Tlhe phrase
seems to have various meanings in different jurisdictions and different contexts, generat-
ing substantial confusion among the bench and bar, as well as for physicians who are
called upon to provide expert testimony." Id. at 385-86. Expert testimony also poses issues
with regard to jury trials because
"[y]ou can't get to the jury without an expert in most cases today. . . ." In ad-
dition, challenges "make trials incredibly burdensome for plaintiffs... [be-
cause they] are forced to litigate expert issues twice, once before the judge in
a mini-trial on the expert, and if you survive that, you have to bring the ex-
pert back at trial." "The weaker economic party will be hurt, which is usually
the plaintiff. ... "
James L. Dam, Expert Testimony Is Harder to Use: U.S. Supreme Court, LAW. WKLY. USA,
Apr. 5, 1999, at 1 (quoting two plaintiffs attorneys).
244. For example, "[n]o consensus exists among judges, attorneys, or academic com-
mentators as to whether 'reasonable medical certainty' means 'more probable than not' or
'beyond a reasonable doubt,' or something in between." Lewin, supra note 242, at 380.
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fined allusions to the reasonable medical certainty standard.245
For example, the standard for reasonable medical certainty may
not necessarily be the same for scientists and medical profession-
als because the former testimony is typically elicited on the gen-
eral causation prong of factual causation while the latter is elic-
ited on the specific causation prong of factual causation. This
demarcation is significant because most scientific evidence on the
general causation prong is largely based upon probabilistic or sta-
tistical evidence regarding populations, whereas medical evidence
on the specific causation prong is based upon particularistic evi-
dence geared toward the individual plaintiff. Thus, courts may be
erroneously applying the reasonable medical certainty standard
cited in legal discourse to scientists and physicians alike, even
though physicians typically do not draw causal inferences on
purely probabilistic studies of groups.246
In tort law, courts associate legal certainty with the fifty-one
percent probability or "the more likely than not" standard that
defines a preponderance of the evidence.2 47 The more probable
than not standard measures the extent to which one party's the-
ory of the case or proposition is more likely true than not.248 The
legal certainty standard requires courts and juries to view the
presentation of a case according to an either/or paradigm. This
paradigm is often translated into truth versus untruth. Even
though there is a wide range between truth and untruth, the le-
gal certainty standard defines truth by a fifty-one percent prob-
ability, with untruth representing the remainder. The quest to
achieve legal certainty is embodied in the reasonable certainty
rule, a rule of evidence adopted to prohibit speculative or conjec-
tural opinions on the issue of damages. Professor Lewin explains
that "[tihe reasonable-certainty rule... relates to the standard of
proof for establishing damages, especially with respect to condi-
tions or illnesses that the plaintiff might suffer in the future."249
245. See id. at 386.
246. Where the preponderance standard is based upon a fifty-one percent probability,
scientists studying populations and drawing scientific conclusions based upon probabili-
ties may be able to perform a crude conversion. But physicians do not necessarily treat
individual patients on statistical or probable bases; therefore, a conversion of the physi-
cian's opinion to a probability may be akin to comparing apples with oranges.
247. See, Beecher-Monas, supra note 102, at 1099.
248. See id. at 1099 n.319 (citing Richard Lempert, The New Evidence Scholarship
Analyzing the Process of Proof, 66 B.U. L. REV. 439, 451-52 (1986)).
249. Lewin, supra note 242, at 408.
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Professor Lewin also notes that the reasonable certainty rule was
created "[t]o prevent sympathetic juries from awarding substan-
tial damages based on speculation."25 °
Unlike the legal certainty standard applied to the element of
factual causation to determine its existence, the scientific stan-
dard only demonstrates the probabilities of cause. For example,
the scientist may or may not infer the existence of a causal rela-
tionship between an agent and a disease in the population.2 5'
Such causal inferences are based on many factors, like the confi-
dence interval, statistical significance testing, and the presence of
confounders.2 The confidence interval measures the confidence
of the probability that an association between an agent and a dis-
ease exists.253 Confidence intervals are purely statistical meas-
ures of association that are limited by statistical significance test-
ing.2 54 Statistical significance testing measures the probability
that the observed data will depart from the null hypothesis.5 For
example, the scientist will measure the frequency with which the
data departs from the hypothesis that an agent has no effect on
the population. 6 The purpose of statistical significance testing is
to account for the probability that a disease occurs by chance as
opposed to exposure to a toxic agent. 7 If there is less than a five
percent probability that the data will depart from the null hy-
pothesis, the association between the exposure and the disease is
considered statistically significant.5 However, a probability in
excess of five percent suggests that the association is not statisti-
250. Id.
251. See Beecher-Monas, supra note 102, at 1108-09.
252. For a discussion of confounders, see supra note 37.
253. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 149, at 33-34, 218-19; see also TIMMRECK, supra note
23, at 232.
254. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 149, at 199.
255. See Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 722 (Tex. 1997).
256. In Havner, the court stated:
A researcher tests hypotheses and does so by testing whether the data sup-
port a particular hypothesis. The starting point is the null hypothesis, which
assumes that there is no difference or no effect.... The researcher tries to
find evidence against the hypothesis. The statement that the researcher sus-
pects may be true is stated as the alternative hypothesis. If a significant dif-
ference is found, the null hypothesis is rejected. If a significant difference is
not found, the null hypothesis is accepted.
Id. at 722 (citations omitted).
257. FRIEDMAN, supra note 149, at 198.
258. Id. at 189; see also Beecher-Monas, supra note 102, at 1100-01.
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cally significant.259 Statistical significance testing looks at the
limits of the confidence interval range.26 ° Some scientists believe
that the primary focus should be on the approximate position of
the interval as a whole, not on the ends of the confidence inter-
val.2 6 ' These conventions of scientific study are patently distinct
from the conventions of legal resolution of controversy and, thus,
their respective inferences and outcomes should not be blindly
equated or commingled.
Apart from both legal certainty and scientific certainty, the
medical standard for certainty embodies the validity of clinical
observations and differential diagnoses to arrive at the source or
cause of the injury being treated.22 Clinical observations and dif-
ferential diagnoses are necessarily performed on a case by case
basis because the goal of the medical professional is to treat the
individual patient.263 This case-by-case requirement for treatment
makes any standard or uniform convention for differential diag-
noses impossible.26' Despite the potential for different methods,
there are norms in the medical community that form a skeletal
outline for conducting differential diagnoses.265 The most basic
norms are diagnoses based upon clinical observations, which in-
clude taking a clinical history and conducting a physical exami-
nation. 6 From these two categories, medical professionals are
able to render differential diagnoses in order to treat an injured
patient.26' Differential diagnosis "'describe[s] a process whereby
medical doctors experienced in diagnostic techniques provide tes-
timony countering other possible causes... of the injuries at is-
sue.'"268 The result of a differential diagnosis is a physician's in-
259. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 149, at 199.
260. See id. at 198-99.
26L See Beecher-Monas, supra note 102, at 1105.
262. See, e.g., Cottle v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 882 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
263. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 758 (3d Cir. 1994), affd in part
and rev'd in part, 221 F.3d 449 (3d Cir. 2000).
264. See id.
265. See id.
266. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 149, at 37-38.
267. See Farber, supra note 115, at 1257 (1987); see also Cottle v. Superior Court, 5
Cal. Rptr. 2d 882 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); Earl v. Cryovac, 772 P.2d 725 (Idaho Ct. App.
1989).
268. See Berry v. CSX Transp., Inc., 709 So. 2d 552, 562 n.9 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)
(quoting Hines v. Consol. Rail Corp., 926 F.2d 262, 270 n.6 (3d Cir. 1991)). In Berry, the
court held that "under Frye and its Florida progeny, when [an] expert's opinion is well-
founded and based upon generally accepted scientific principles and methodology, it is not
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ference or conclusion about the cause of an injury.269 Further, the
medical professional may account for the cause of the disease
with far less than fifty-one percent probability because the medi-
cal professional must assess the patient's complaint, the history
of the complaint, any other illnesses the patient may have, and
the patient's occupation and habits."' From this information, it is
possible for the physician to arrive at more than one cause for a
plaintiffs injury. 17' To hone in on cause, the physician uses the
collected medical information to perform a differential diagnosis
to rule out possible alternative diseases and causes of these dis-
eases by outlining the possibilities and further narrowing them
based upon the physician's experience 27 1 It is obvious that this
technique for identifying a cause does not fit snugly within the ei-
ther/or paradigm or the scientist's probabilistic schema.
Considering the different objectives and goals of the legal
community, the scientific community, and the medical community
in ascertaining certainty on the issue of factual causation, it is
not necessarily appropriate or equitable to apply one certainty
standard to each unique discipline. Instead, courts should con-
sider the objectives, goals, and limits placed on the experts in
each discipline and then determine a certainty standard commen-
surate with the unique exigencies of each discipline. Presently,
courts view reasonable scientific/medical certainty as they do le-
gal certainty, where legal certainty is the ability, with fifty-one
percent probability, to establish truth through an either/or propo-
sition using controversy testing.7 3 For example, the evidence, as
a whole, either supports the plaintiffs theory of a case or sup-
ports the defendant's theory of the case. This is the judicial ap-
proach to assessing truth and dispensing justice. This either/or
necessary that the expert's opinion be generally accepted as well." Id. at 567. The court
went on to say:
"[A] jury must be allowed to make credibility determinations and weigh con-
flicting evidence in order to decide the likely truth of a matter not itself ini-
tially resolvable by common knowledge or lay reasoning.... An expert's opin-
ion need not be generally accepted in the scientific community before it can
be sufficiently reliable and probative in support of a jury finding."
Id. at 567 (quoting Osburn v. Anchor Lab., Inc., 825 F.2d 908, 915-16 (5th Cir. 1987)).
269. See id. at 562.
270. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 755 (3d Cir. 1994), affd in part
and rev'd in part, 221 F.3d 449 (3d Cir. 2000).
271. See id. at 758.
272. See id. at 758-59.
273. See Beecher-Monas, supra note 102, at 1094.
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scenario achieves the goals of the civil justice system by creating
confidence in a judicial decision based upon an existing contro-
versy between two competing parties. In essence, there is a de-
termination, ranging from supposition to actual, that one party is
right and another is wrong.
In the scientific community, the standard of certainty regard-
ing scientific testimony or evidence is premised upon probabilistic
evaluation as opposed to either/or decisions. 4 In fact, scientists
accept a larger degree of uncertainty in their studies because they
acknowledge that uncertainty is inevitable.275 Also, scientists ac-
cept that uncertainties do not invalidate studies, whereas judges
wedded to the ontological view may find it disconcerting to fail in
deducing causal connections because of stalwart reliance on
traceability or linearity theories. In addition, the scientist's confi-
dence interval measures are not consistent with the judicial view
of sufficient probability to meet the legal preponderance stan-
dard. The former is the scientist's conservative posture taken to
avoid claiming an association where there is none. The latter is
the judge's choice as to which party's theory is more believable.
The scientist is not concerned with choosing between two parties
based upon believing one over the other; rather, the scientist ex-
pends effort to assess all available data for the purpose of deter-
mining how frequently exposure would be associated with disease
as a matter of chance.276
By combining the standard for legal certainty with scientific
principles of certainty, courts require a higher standard for valid-
ity of the testimony than scientists would because, at least in
toxic tort cases, courts have limited scientific testimony on the
general causation prong of factual causation to epidemiological
studies. 77 Courts support this limitation by asserting that only
epidemiological studies comport with legal certainty; however,
scientists routinely employ various methods in their studies. As
well, limiting scientific evidence or testimony in the name of
achieving legal certainty ignores the scientist's very acceptance of
uncertainty as inevitable in the test of truth through scientific re-
search and replication of an observed event.
274. Id. at 1097-98.
275. Id.
276. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 149, at 172-73.
277. See Beecher-Monas, supra note 102, at 1100-03.
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Combining the standard for legal certainty with medical prin-
ciples of diagnosis and treatment is even more controversial. The
goal or objective of a medical professional is to treat or prevent in-
jury.278 Thus, the medical professional is less concerned with an
either/or determination. Instead, the medical professional seeks
to reject causes for a disease or injury, through differential diag-
noses, to arrive at an immediate and effective course of treatment
for a patient. During these efforts, the medical professional con-
siders a range of causes and tests these causes for purposes of
treatment before excluding them as potential sources of disease
or injury.19 The standard for legal certainty would be offended by
requiring a jury to test potential causes for disease, one of which
may be exposure to a toxin, before deciding which it believed was
the source that caused plaintiffs injury. Thus, applying the legal
standard of certainty to medical professionals also appears incon-
sistent with the methods and practices of that discipline. A medi-
cal professional should not be required to demonstrate that expo-
sure to a toxin was the specific cause of a toxic tort plaintiffs
injury; rather, the medical professional should be responsible for
explaining the differential diagnoses and the potential or possible
causes of the injury. Further, the toxic tort plaintiff should not be
penalized unjustly for the inherent uncertainty of medical diag-
noses.
These diagnoses should be admissible as support for plaintiffs
theory of the case on the specific causation prong of factual causa-
tion, so long as such diagnoses are based on medically valid tech-
niques or methodologies. Thus, so long as the medical profes-
sional performed the diagnosis using standard techniques
recognized in the medical community, his causal inferences
should be admitted, and his opinions should be weighed by the
jury as a matter of credibility.8 °
278. See Earl v. Cryovac, 772 P.2d 725, 727 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984).
In scientific research, where the replication of an observed event is the ulti-
mate test of truth, the usual standard of [causal association] is a high degree
of [scientific] certainty. Conversely, in diagnosis and treatment of a specific
patient, where the objective is to find a cure or to prevent further harm, a
doctor may ascribe causal significance to a possibility that falls short of a [le-
gal] probability.
Id.
279. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 755-56 (3d Cir. 1994), affd in
part and rev'd in part, 221 F.3d 449 (3d Cir. 2000).
280. See id. at 758. Judge Becker stated:
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Regardless of the differing goals and objectives of these three
communities, and even court recognition of the inequity in apply-
ing legal certainty standards to scientific and medical certainty
standards, these same courts seem unwilling to change the para-
digm to better reflect the principles supporting each of the three
disciplines. For example, in Sterling v. Velsicol Chemical Corp.,281
the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that "numerous jurisdictions
have rejected medical experts' conclusions based upon a 'probabil-
ity,' a 'likelihood,' and an opinion that something is 'more likely
than not' as insufficient medical proof."282 The court also noted
that "Tennessee courts have adopted a far less stringent standard
of proof and have required only that the plaintiffs prove a causal
connection between their injuries and the defendant's tortious
conduct by a preponderance of the evidence."283 Thus, "plaintiffs'
proof by a reasonable medical certainty requires them only to es-
tablish that their particular injuries more likely than not were
caused by ingesting contaminated water, and their proofs may be
neither speculative nor conjectural."2"4 The Sixth Circuit, like
other courts, commingled the standard for legal certainty with
that of medical professionals without considering that the stan-
dards are not mutually exclusive nor subject to disciplinary cross-
pollination. The Sixth Circuit further stated that "[m]edical tes-
timony that ingesting contaminated water 'possibly,' 'may have,'
'might have,' or 'could have' caused the plaiptiffs' presently ascer-
tainable or anticipated injuries does not constitute the same level
of proof as a conclusion by a reasonable medical certainty."2"' Un-
[A]lthough differential diagnosis is a generally accepted technique, no par-
ticular combination of techniques chosen by a doctor to assess an individual
patient is likely to have been generally accepted. But unlike a methodology
used in conducting a scientific study, lack of general acceptance is not a sign
of unreliability, it is merely a result of the fact that the medical community
will rarely have considered the reliability of a particular process of differen-
tial diagnosis used in an individual case. Nor is it likely that the particular
combination will have been published and subject to peer review, because a
particular version of differential diagnosis will rarely be of general interest to
the medical community.
Id. As Judge Becker observed, the admissibility standards for scientists and physicians
necessarily must be different and, therefore, it would be consistent to assign different cer-
tainty standards for scientists and physicians.
281. 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988).
282. Id. at 1201.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
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fortunately, as a practical matter, the latter terms are a more
consistent representation of the causal inferences drawn by medi-
cal professionals on the specific causation prong of factual causa-
tion." 6 Thus, when courts adopt the reasonable medical certainty
approach, they still require the plaintiff to meet a heightened
standard of proof because physicians are called upon to satisfy le-
286. Cf. Cottle v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 882 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992). In Cottle,
approximately 175 owners and renters of residential properties sued various defendants
for personal injuries and property damages as a result of defendants' construction and de-
velopment of that property subdivision on a site that had been used previously as a dump-
ing ground for certain oil industry hazardous waste and other byproducts. Id. at 883.
Plaintiffs presented expert medical testimony on the specific causation prong of factual
causation in an in limine show cause hearing. Id. at 884. The trial judge excluded the tes-
timony of plaintiffs' expert witnesses, because he found in his view:
"after reading the.., prima facie showings... there is no witness or wit-
nesses who can testify, that I know of-none have been presented to me-
that any hazardous or toxic substance has, to a reasonable medical probabil-
ity, a certainty or anything beyond the most tenuous possibility caused any
illness in any plaintiff or injured or exacerbated any injury."
Id. at 886.
One medical expert testified that plaintiffs' medical conditions "'could possibly be par-
tially due to and/or exacerbated by continuous exposure' or 'could possibly be [or have
been] exacerbated by continuous exposure' to chemical substances." Id. at 893. While an-
other physician testified that "similar problems 'have been associated with,' 'could be di-
rectly related to effects of,' 'may occur in children as a result of,' and 'may be related to'
[chemical] exposure." Id. at 894. The trial judge was not convinced that the testimony by
these experts met the reasonable medical probability standard, even though the trial
judge did not distinguish between scientific experts and medical experts. Id. at 893. In de-
scribing reasonable medical probability, the trial judge stated:
"The law is well settled that in personal injury action causation must be
proven within a reasonable medical probability based upon competent expert
testimony. Mere possibility alone is insufficient to establish a prima facie
case.... That there is a distinction between a reasonable medical 'probabil-
ity' and a medical 'possibility' needs little discussion. There can be many pos-
sible 'causes,' indeed, an infinite number of circumstances which can produce
an injury or disease. A possible cause only becomes 'probable' when, in the
absence of other reasonable causal explanations, it becomes more likely than
not that the injury was a result of its action. This is the outer limits of infer-
ence upon which an issue may be submitted to the jury."
Id. at 892 (quoting Jones v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 163 Cal. App. 3d 396, 402-03 (1985)).
A court's insistence that a physician perform a differential diagnosis to meet the reason-
able medical certainty standard is very different from the insistence that a physician ex-
clude other reasonable explanations. It is the existence of other reasonable causal expla-
nations that makes it impossible for a physician in good standing to choose one reasonable
causal explanation over another. A court's insistence on the definitive exclusion of other
reasonable causal explanations places an extra and heightened burden on the toxic tort
plaintiff trying to establish the specific causation prong of factual causation. The nature
and purpose of the medical profession and its reliance on differential diagnosis is to nar-
row the causes, sometimes to a few or even the one possible cause. These reasonable pos-
sibilities are the exact phenomena that treating physicians face when presented with an
individual patient, and it should be these possibilities that are accounted for in a certainty
standard tailored to meet the exigencies of the physician's discipline.
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gal standards of certainty, which do not comport with medical
certainty.
C. Legal Sufficiency and Factual Causation
Legal sufficiency and admissibility are not mutually exclusive
standards in a toxic tort case."' The misunderstood relationship
between legal sufficiency and admissibility can be traced to the
confusion between evidentiary reliability standards and quantum
of proof requirements. This misunderstanding and confusion can
result in irreparable damage to the plaintiffs case. Reliability
testing involves the admissibility of expert testimony, while the
quantum of evidence involves the sufficiency of plaintiffs body of
proof.288 An inquiry regarding the sufficiency of the evidence con-
cerns whether the party has produced sufficient evidence, or
enough evidence, to convince a reasonable juror that the opinion
of the party's expert is correct.289 A legal sufficiency review should
consider, synergistically, all of the evidence.290 In contrast,
"[aldmissibility entails a threshold inquiry over whether a certain
piece of evidence ought to be admitted at trial."29'
Confusion in the application of standards is also attributable to
the types of evidence required to prove factual causation in toxic
tort cases. Steve Gold explains that reliance on statistical evi-
dence is a necessity for proving the general causation prong of
factual causation because of the inherent difficulties in uncover-
ing direct proof of causal links between exposure and injury.292
The reliance on statistics and probabilities as opposed to direct,
individual observation creates disparities in the application of
standards and burdens.293 Gold states:
287. See In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 52 F.3d 1124, 1132 (2d Cir. 1995)
("The 'admissibility' and 'sufficiency' of scientific evidence necessitate different inquiries
and involve different stakes.").
288. See Berry v. CSX Transp., Inc., 709 So. 2d 552, 568 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
289. Id.
290. See Jennifer Murray, Note, Reformation Of The Legal Sufficiency Standard For
Expert Testimony: Expert Testimony Must Be Reliable And Epidemiological Evidence Must
Show Double The Risk: Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 40 TEx. SUP. CT. J. 846 (July
9, 1997), 29 TEX_ TECH. L. REv. 251, 261 (1998).
29L Id. (citing Joint E. & S., 52 F.3d at 1132).
292. See Gold, supra note 226, at 380.
293. Id. at 380-81.
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Because toxic tort plaintiffs and defendants rarely can introduce
"particularistic" evidence, which directly addresses the issue of cau-
sation in the individual case, causation can not properly be formu-
lated as a yes-or-no fact. Rather, the parties can show an increased
risk or enhanced probability of disease that results from defendant's
conduct or from other, non-defendant causes. Thus, in toxic torts the
causation inquiry is reduced to questions of the existence and magni-
tude of a fact probability.
Courts and commentators have responded to this situation by col-
lapsing the burden of proof and the standard of persuasion into a
single test. The blurring of fact and belief probability conflates the
two aspects which describe the plaintiffs task-the definition of the
fact or element to be proven ("burden"), and the amount of credence
which must be given to that fact in order to support a finding ("stan-
dard"). Typically, the "collapsed" test is expressed in shorthand, i.e.,
'plaintiff must show that causation is more likely than not"...
[where] "more likely than not"... refer[s] to belief probability.294
Gold's assessment of the collapsing of fact probability and be-
lief probability is consistent with recent toxic tort jurisprudence.
For example, Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Havner typi-
fies this collapsing as represented by the reviewing court's deci-
sion that reasonable minds could not differ on the general causa-
tion prong in spite of plaintiffs' expert testimony and a jury
verdict for plaintiffs.295 In expressing an opinion about the cor-
rectness of plaintiffs' expert's opinion, under the guise of a reli-
ability determination, the Havner court conflated fact probability
with belief probability and ultimately usurped the jury's role as
arbiter of credibility, weight, and persuasion of all admissible
evidence.
As articulated by Gold, courts and some commentators are not
making distinctions between the burden of production of evi-
dence296 on the element of factual causation and the burden of
persuasion.297 The burden of production of evidence is of great
importance in determining the legal sufficiency of evidence pre-
sented by the party pleading the existence of the fact, because the
burden requires the plaintiff to bring forward a quantum of ad-
missible proof. The party establishing the existence of the fact
294. Id. at 384-86.
295. See discussion supra Part II.B (concerning Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner,
953 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1997)).
296. See Gold, supra note 226, at 378-81.
297. Id.
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may do so by presenting direct or circumstantial evidence.298 In
toxic tort cases, direct evidence of a causal nexus between a de-
fendant's product or agent and plaintiffs exposure injury is rarely
available; thus, plaintiffs must rely primarily on circumstantial
evidence to meet both admissibility and legal sufficiency stan-
dards. In order for circumstantial evidence to satisfy the burden
of production, the evidence must be more than a scintilla.2 99 The
evidence must be such that a reasonable person could draw from
it the inference of the existence of the particular fact to be
proved,"' with that evidence and inference being viewed in a
light most favorable to the nonmoving party, usually the plain-
tiff.301
But when the evidence is circumstantial, forensic disputes of-
ten arise as to its sufficiency to warrant a jury drawing the de-
sired inference.0 2 Courts in civil cases have stated that the bur-
den of producing evidence is satisfied, even by circumstantial
evidence, if there are sufficient facts for the jury to reasonably
conclude that the preponderance favors liability.0 3 A judge is
298. See Herrington v. Leaf River Forest Prods., Inc., 733 So. 2d 774, 777 (Miss. 1999)
("Circumstantial evidence consists of 'evidence of a fact or a set of facts, from which the
existence of another fact may reasonably be inferred." (citations omitted)).
299. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993) ("[In the event
the trial court concludes that the scintilla of evidence presented supporting a position is
insufficient to allow a reasonable juror to conclude that the position more likely than not is
true, the court remains free to direct a [verdict] ... [or] grant summary judgment."). The
Supreme Court, in the opinion delivered by Justice Blackmun, does not require that the
plaintiff persuade the trial judge that her factual theory of the case on the issue of factual
causation is correct. Id. at 595. Instead, the trial judge only requires the plaintiff to pro-
duce a body of evidence that can be reviewed to determine if there is a sufficient quantum
of proof to cause a reasonable juror to exercise belief probability in favor of plaintiffs the-
ory. Id. If a reasonable juror could express belief probability in plaintiffs theory, then the
matter falls within the province of the trier of fact. See id. In essence, the trial judge who
draws her own opinion about the correctness of plaintiffs theory must ask herself if the
quantum of evidence supports an alternate belief that could be held by another.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. See Gold, supra note 226, at 381 n.22 (citing CHARLES T. McCORMICK,
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §§ 337-40 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter
McComICK]).
303. See, e.g., In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 52 F.3d 1124, 1126 (2d Cir.
1995); see also Gold, supra note 226, at 381 (arguing that judges presiding over criminal
cases should be rigorous in their role as gatekeeper on issues of admissibility of expert tes-
timony and legal sufficiency). Gold's view is consistent with providing leeway for toxic tort
plaintiffs for at least two reasons. First, the stakes are much higher for an accused in
criminal cases than for institutional defendants in civil toxic tort cases. Second, the party
typically in a vulnerable position in toxic tort cases is the plaintiff, not the defendant.
Therefore, any substantive and procedural safeguards created because of relaxed stan-
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guided in the sufficiency determination by common sense, experi-
ence, and opinion as to the limits of reasonable inference from the
facts proven." 4 At this stage, the party pressing the toxic tort
claim is seeking only to survive a motion for summary judgment
on the issue of the sufficiency of the expert testimony.0 5 This
stage is critical to toxic tort plaintiffs because it marks the point
at which a judge is faced with the pivotal decision whether to re-
view the amount of admissible evidence, not the specific type, to
conclude, after a synergistic review, that there exists a genuine
issues of material fact.0 6 Unfortunately, the unwary trial judge
can render a decision about the correctness of the plaintiffs ex-
pert testimony or evidence on the factual causation element if he
cannot separate the gatekeeping role for the admissibility of a
specific type of evidence from the conventional procedural role,
dependent on common sense, that enough evidence exists to or-
dain the presence of a factual controversy between two parties."'
As previously mentioned, reliance on circumstantial evidence
in a toxic tort case is undeniable because causal relationships be-
tween agent, exposure, and disease are not susceptible to direct
proof308 The amount and degree of circumstantial evidence that
will satisfy the test for legal sufficiency at the summary judgment
stage is contingent upon the court's decision to apply minimal re-
quirements for sufficiency, 30 9 stringent requirements for suffi-
ciency, 310 or some middle ground between the two approaches.
The minimal requirements standard for legal sufficiency is ex-
dards of legal sufficiency and admissibility in civil cases should inure to the plaintiff so
long as these safeguards result in equitable treatment of the litigating parties.
304. See McCORMICK, supra note 302, § 339.
305. See, e.g., Joint E. & S., 52 F.3d at 1124.
306. See id. In an action involving workplace exposure to asbestos-containing products,
the district court found that plaintiffs epidemiological evidence failed to satisfy the suffi-
ciency requirements, i.e., Bradford Hill "Standardized Mortality Ratio" (SMR) factors em-
ployed to make a causal assessment of the association between an agent and disease; and,
thus, the evidence on the general causation prong was insufficient. Id. at 1128. The Sec-
ond Circuit concluded that the district court "impermissibly crossed the line from assess-
ing evidentiary reliability to usurping the role of the jury." Id. at 1131. Accordingly, the
Second Circuit reversed the district court's grant of defendanes motion for directed verdict
that came subsequent to a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff. Id.
307. See id. Trial judges must avoid rendering "independent assessments of witnesses'
conclusions and comparative credibilities" so as not to surpass the Daubert limit of evalu-
ating evidentiary reliability. Id. at 1133.
308. See Callahan, supra note 50, at 617.
309. See BOSTON & MADDEN, supra note 15, at 368-89.
310. Id.
TOXIC TORT LITIGATION
plained in Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co.,"' where each party's
expert presented contrary testimony on the issue of factual causa-
tion in an herbicide exposure case in which plaintiff alleged that
he contracted pulmonary fibrosis. 12 The court, in its decision to
apply the minimal requirements standard for legal sufficiency,
stated:
Judges, both trial and appellate, have no special competence to re-
solve the complex and refractory causal issues raised by the attempt
to link low-level exposure to toxic chemicals with human disease. On
questions such as these, which stand at the frontier of current medi-
cal and epidemiological inquiry, if experts are willing to testify that
such a link exists, it is for the jury to decide whether to credit the
testimony.
Thus, a cause-effect relationship need not be clearly estab-
lished by animal or epidemiological studies before a doctor can tes-
tify that, in his opinion, such relationship exists. As long as the basic
methodology employed to reach such a conclusion is sound, such as
the use of tissue samples, standard tests, and patient examina-
tions.... In a courtroom, the test for allowing a plaintiff to recover
in a tort suit of this type is not scientific certainty but legal suffi-
ciency; if reasonable jurors could conclude from expert testimony
that [exposure] more likely than not caused [plaintiffs] injury, the
fact that another jury might reach the opposite conclusion or that
science would require more evidence before conclusively considering
the causation question resolved is irrelevant.
313
The minimal requirements standard for legal sufficiency may
appear to relieve the judge from the difficult task of evaluating
the reliability of expert testimony and the validity of techniques
and methodology, but in fact it does not. The judge retains the re-
sponsibility to determine the admissibility of expert testimony.1 4
In addition, the judge remains responsible for deciding if evidence
presented by both parties is legally sufficient, based upon com-
311. 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
312. Id. at 1533.
313. Id. at 1534, 1535-36. The Ferebee court did not require a legal sufficiency deter-
mination to rest on a specific scientific or medical test. This inclusive approach to the
quantum of evidence that will satisfy legal sufficiency is consistent with the scientises ap-
proach of considering various studies before completing a study and expressing an opinion
about the results of that study.
314 See id. at 1535; Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364, 367-68 (Md. 1978) ("[The] court has
held that the determination of similar and related issues [of expert testimony] are gener-
ally matters within the sound discretion of the trial court.").
2002]
936 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:875
mon sense, experience, and opinion, to create a genuine issue of
material fact."5 What is not required of the judge is an evaluation
of the credibility or the correctness of an expert's opinion when
that expert's testimony is reliable and his methodology is
sound.31 6
The stringent requirement for legal sufficiency is expressed in
Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,"' where the review-
ing court entered a judgment notwithstanding a verdict in favor
of defendants.3 18 The Fifth Circuit, in deciding that plaintiffs ex-
pert's testimony was insufficient, determined that the number of
epidemiological studies319 presented by the defendant demon-
strated that the relative risk320 produced from the study did not
support the proposition that exposure to defendant's product,
Bendectin, caused birth defects.32' Plaintiff presented the testi-
mony of an expert who conducted re-analysis on the leading epi-
demiological study and concluded that Bendectin is a human
teratogen and is capable of causing birth defects, including limb
reduction defect.
22
The Fifth Circuit panel viewed the definitions for legal suffi-
ciency and other procedural principles as "general and abstract
formulations [that] lose much of their usefulness,.. . when we at-
315. See MCCORMICK, supra note 302, § 339.
316. Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1535; see Reed, 391 A.2d at 367-68.
317. 874 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1989).
318. See id. at 308-09.
319. Resorting to the numbers of epidemiological studies is reminiscent of the Frye
general acceptance test that compared the number of experts willing to ascribe to one view
as opposed to an alternative, contrary view and giving credence to the position supported
by more studies. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). In Brock, the
role of the judge should have been limited to exercising his common sense, experience, and
opinion on the sole issue of the existence of a genuine issue of material fact presented by
experts with contrary opinions, yet adequately sound methods supporting their opinions.
See MCCORMICK, supra note 302, § 339.
320. Relative risk is defined as the ratio of the rate of incidence of a disease among
those exposed to the disease as compared to the rate of those not exposed to the disease.
Brock, 874 F.2d at 312. Relative risk determines the chance that a segment of the exposed
group will or will not contract a disease. Id. Incidence rates are the primary measure of
disease in a population. Incidence rates compare the number of people developing new
cases of disease within a population in a given time period with the total number of people
exposed to the risk of developing the disease in a given time period. See TIMMRECK, supra
note 23, at 141-45.
321. Brock, 874 F.2d at 309.
322. Id. at 314-15.
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tempt to apply them to concrete factual situations."323 The court
stated:
The first problem is that there is often no consensus in the medical
community regarding whether a given substance is teratogenic; this
is the case with Bendectin. Moreover, while we now recognize some
of the many factors which can cause birth defects, medical science is
now unable, and will undoubtedly remain unable for the foreseeable
future, to trace a known birth defect back to its precipitating cause.
The second problem, in addition to the problem of unknowability, is
that juries are asked to resolve these questions, upon which even our
brightest medical minds disagree, in order to resolve the case at
hand and decide whether the plaintiff is entitled to recovery, and in
so doing must necessarily resort to speculation.
... Confronted, as we now are, with difficult medical questions,
courts must critically evaluate the reasoning process by which the
experts connect data to their conclusions in order for courts consis-
tently and rationally to resolve the disputes before them. Moreover,
in mass torts the same issue is often presented over and over to ju-
ries in different cases, and the juries often split both ways on the is-
sue. The effect of this is to create a state of uncertainty among manu-
facturers contemplating the research and development of new, and
potentially life saving drugs. Appellate courts, if they take the lead
in resolving those questions upon which juries will go both ways, can
reduce some of the uncertainty which can tend to produce a sub-
optimal amount of new drug development.
324
The court's use of the stringent standard for legal sufficiency
increasingly enforces the paternalistic view that the jury is inca-
pable of asserting a rational conclusion about the credibility of
the experts and using common sense and experience in its weigh-
ing of evidence. Courts relying on the stringent standard for legal
sufficiency create the fiction that they are in a better position to
evaluate and decide complex scientific issues, even when such is-
sues are purely fact based. In essence, these same courts are
usurping the province of the jury to assess the credibility and
weight of admissible evidence to arrive at a belief supported by
the available facts.
The Fifth Circuit also assumed, without reason, that verdicts
must be consistent when toxic tort issues are similar.2 5 Because
two juries might decide a case differently is not support for con-
323. Id. at 309.
324. Id. at 309-10.
325. Id. at 309.
2002]
938 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:875
verting the standard for legal sufficiency into one of admissibility
or persuasion as a matter of law before reaching the trier of fact.
Accordingly, where the scales of justice are already severely bent
in favor of defendants, the minimal standard of legal sufficiency
should be adopted when evaluating evidence of factual causation.
D. Preponderance of Evidence and Factual Causation
Preponderance of the evidence is traditionally characterized as
the requirement to demonstrate that the facts more likely than
not prove the existence of causation."' "[The phrase [preponder-
ance of the evidence] does not simply mean volume of evidence or
number of witnesses."327 The preponderance is evinced by the
trier of fact's belief that the existence of the contested fact is more
probable than its nonexistence."2
In virtually every case, plaintiffs carry the burden of proof on
the factual causation element.329 The defendant is not required to
disprove factual causation.33 ° Instead, a defendant need only chal-
lenge the evidence presented by the plaintiff using the conven-
tional litigation devices of "vigorous cross-examination, presenta-
tion of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of
proof' (persuasion).3 ' The plaintiff must present a theory of the
case, supported by evidence and testimony, which can withstand
defendant's use of conventional litigation devices to oppose a find-
ing of sufficiency. 32 If a plaintiff withstands these challenges, the
trial court must conclude that the case is ripe for jury considera-
tion, after which plaintiff must be prepared to carry the burden of
persuasion.333 The burden of persuasion measures a jury's belief
about the facts and inferences to be drawn from the complete
body of evidence presented by parties.' After weighing each
party's version of the relative truth, the jury is called upon to de-
326. See MCCORMICK, supra note 302, § 339.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id. § 337; see Callahan, supra note 50, at 605.
330. MCCORMICK, supra note 302, § 337.
331. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc, 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993).
332. See id.
333. See id.; MCCORMICK, supra note 302, §§ 337-40.
334. See GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 54-60 (3d ed.
1996).
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cide which party's version of the controversy represents the prob-
able truth. 5
As current federal case law has heightened the standard for
admissibility of expert testimony, toxic tort case law has also
heightened the standard for believability. Despite the higher pre-
ponderance standard measuring believability in toxic tort cases,
judges remain vested with the discretion to try to correct the im-
balance in the burdens shouldered by toxic exposure plaintiffs.
Judges may allocate burdens to account for social or public policy
considerations. Judges who ignore the apparent imbalance be-
tween toxic exposure plaintiffs on the one hand and defendants
on the other typically follow the strong preponderance rule for
truth probability.3 6 Those judges aware of the inherent imbal-
ances between toxic tort litigants typically follow the weak or
minimal preponderance rule for truth probability.33
The strong preponderance standard employs an all-or-nothing
approach, where the toxic exposure plaintiff is compensated only
after persuading the trier of fact that her entire claimed injury
was the consequence of a defendant's tortious act.338 This stan-
dard is poorly suited for toxic tort litigation and its factual causa-
tion element because most exposures to harmful toxins cannot be
isolated with precision from background risks. 39 Thus, if the trier
of fact believes that a plaintiffs harm is less than the fifty-one
percent believability ratio, she will not be compensated for the
percentage of harm that is actually attributable to her expo-
sure.34° For this reason, the strong preponderance standard works
a double hardship on toxic exposure plaintiffs who may also be in
a jurisdiction that requires meeting a heightened standard for le-
gal sufficiency prior to reaching the trier of fact. 4'
The more equitable and preferable standard to apply in toxic
tort cases is the weak or minimal version of the preponderance
335. McCoRIncK, supra note 302, § 339.
336. See Callahan, supra note 50, at 605, 611.
337. See id. at 611.
338. Id. at 610, 611 (citing Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 727 F.2d 506, 516
(5th Cir. 1984)).
339. Id. at 617.
340. Id. at 611.
341. Id. at 610-12.
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rule.342 This version of the preponderance standard allows the
judge to set a baseline standard of the quantum of proof that
would satisfy the factual causation element alone.4 In setting
this baseline, a standard necessarily lower than the heightened
standards currently in existence for legal sufficiency, the judge
communicates to the trier of fact that the amount of proof pre-
sented by plaintiffs is adequate to begin assessing believability.
Under the minimal version of the preponderance standard, the
judge may also consider shifting the burden of believability of cer-
tain facets of the factual causation element-for example, the
general causation prong of any of the three factual causation
tests-to defendants. Such a shifting is supported by the proposi-
tion that defendants are in a better position to meet the burden of
non-persuasion on the general causation prong of the factual cau-
sation element because defendants are usually the custodians of
information about the harmful effects of a toxin or its byproduct.
Regardless of the measures taken to achieve balance in an in-
herently inequitable area of the law, defendants will not become
disadvantaged so long as these balancing measures continue to
allow presumptions favoring toxic exposure plaintiffs to be rebut-
ted by defendants during the believability phase of litigation.
IV. CONCLUSION
Factual causation in toxic tort litigation can be considered ei-
ther overwhelming to the common law tort system, particularly
trial courts vested with the gatekeeping responsibility over scien-
tific and medical expert testimony and evidence, or no different
than traditional tort cases. Under current principles of toxic tort
jurisprudence, many courts and commentators view the element
of factual causation as an insurmountable obstacle to recovery for
those injured from alleged toxic exposure. Meeting admissibility,
certainty, and sufficiency standards need not be insurmountable
so long as the goals of the tort system remain intact and conven-
tional litigation devices are used for the purpose of achieving bal-
ance and equity for toxic exposure plaintiffs.
Before deciding to throw out the baby with the bath water, ju-
342. Id. at 611-12.
343. Id. at 611.
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risprudence should reflect on the philosophy of causation in the
law and the philosophy of causation in modern science. Distin-
guishing between the two disciplines will assist judges in develop-
ing a construct or schema to compartmentalize the theories of
causation across disciplines. Understanding that factual causa-
tion has a unique meaning and set of standards in each distinct
discipline will yield an appreciation of the significance that the
term holds in various disciplines. The legal discourse community
cannot continue to stunt the growth of the term causation by
holding it captive in a purely ontological model. As has been dem-
onstrated by the insurgence of vexing and perplexing problems
arising from toxic tort litigation, the legal ontologist's standards
for causation are constantly being challenged and are continu-
ously being reductio ad absurdum.
Administrative or legislative solutions to ameliorate the imbal-
ances presented by sprays of inconsistent jurisprudence are slow
on the horizon. Furthermore, judicial ontological activism, absent
considerations of equity and public policy, threatens the frame-
work of the adversarial system in toxic tort civil litigation. Toxic
exposure plaintiffs are due an equitable balancing in this area of
the law. This balancing can be achieved by treating each disci-
pline's method for establishing causation with the proper defer-
ence and scope and by recognizing the importance of the goals
and objectives that each pursues. Judicial epistemology in the law
of causation achieved many successes for the tort system. It will
be the reliance on these same epistemological policies, coupled
with ontological principles, that will strike a fair balance of pro-
tections between those who manufacture and promote the use of
toxic products and those individuals harmed by exposure.
20021

